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PREFACE
One of the most important decisions taken
by the Repu-

blic of Panama after becoming an independent
country, November 3, 1903, was to adopt its Constitution on
February 15,
This important document was the result of a
rapid im-

1904.

provisation even though the country as

a

province of Colom-

bia had enjoyed already partial independence in its administration.

This fact emphasizes the attitude towards the im-

migration described in the Constitution.

It is necessary to

recall the principal articles related to this matter in order to understand the legal conditions that ruled the immi-

grants who were already in the country or those who wished
to

corae.^

The purpose of the Constitution was specifically to

promote the general welfare and to guarantee the benefits of
freedom to Panamanians and to any other individual who inha-

bited the country. This statement revealed

a

noble attitude

towards the large number of prospective immigrants attracted

by the possibility of improving their lot.
Citizenship was at once granted to those immigrants
with

a

residence of more than 10 years who wanted to become

Panamanian citizens.

New immigrants had to comply with ad-

ditional conditions such as exercising

a

profession in sci-

ence, art, or industry; or by possessing some real estate
or active capital.

'

vii

Article 19 stood as an example of
ded to respect every human right.
no slaves in Panama.

a

nation who inten-

It said,

"There will be

Anyone who, as a slave, enters the

territory of the Republic will be free." 5
The second Constitution was published in November
22,

1940.

It contained fundamental changes regarding immigrants.

No longer did it aspire to protect the welfare of all of Pa-

nama's inhabitants nor guarantee their freedom.

It declared

itself responsible for the well-being of Panamanian citizens
exclusively.
One can deduce from its provisions, that the new Cons-

titution was the product of

a

national disposition which tend-

ed to be reactionary against immigration.

Panamanians were

fearing an attack on their traditions and sacial structure.
The restrictive measures were especially directed towards the

English-speaking, W e st-Indian Blacks who had migrated into

Panama mainly on four different occassions since 1850.
The Constitution defined "prohibited immigration" (immi-

gracion prohibida) as: Elacks whose language was not Spanish;
•yellows

1

,

and those originating from India, Asia Minor and

North Africa.

The best these people could hope for was res-

tricted citizenship.

Furthermore, the Panamanian-born off-

spring of at least one parent being of prohibited immigrawas
tion, whose race was black and non-Spanish speaking,

denied his or her citizenship.

Unless there was

*

substantial

jurisdiction
proof that he had lived under the Republic's

viii

during his childhood and adult years, the Panamanian of nonSpanish speaking black parents could not aspire to consider

himself

a

citizen.

Only the President of the Republic, had

the power to change his status.

The request of these Pana-

manian-born for prospective citizenship had to be processed
within the first three months after the 1940 Constitution became effective.^

This contrast of attitudes between both constitutions

may seem peculiar.

A review of the laws and statutes on im-

migration passed by the National Assembly, will reveal the

underlying reasons for the change.
as

a

It will show the process

slow but constant one, which grew as

creasing nationalistic tendencies.

a

result of in-

The immigration legisla-

tion also reflected the feelings of helplessness on the part
of Panamanian leaders who were unable to instill in the people, the reaffirmation of their culture and traditions, and
to assure them of a stable national economy which would be

able to absorb the national native labor force.

Taking the 1940 Constitution as

a

reference point, it

is obvious that the group chosen as

'scapegoats' were the

Black-English speaking immigrants.

The problem is not why

but how this group became the victim.

It is important,

there

on four difffore, to analyze the reasons which motivated,
the mass immigraerent occassions, 1850,1880, 1904, 1938,
It is also important
tion of West Indian blacks to Panama.

attitudes and economic conto analyze the socio-political

ditions during their residence in
Panama, vis-a-vis Panamanian attitudes and conditions, Both
analyses will hopefully
disclose the cause and effects of Black
West Indian immigrants
in Panamanian life.

CHAPTER

I

ARRIVAL OF THE WEST INDIANS IN PANAMA
(1850-1914)

2

The sugar plantations in the British
West Indies had a
labor force which was composed of men and
women brought in
from Africa as slaves.
Once the slavery system was abolished
in 1832, the freed slaves faced a difficult
political situation, a chaotic economy and a society which
did not allow

them any upward social mobility.

A look into these factors

will provide us with an understanding of the reasons for the

migration of West Indian blacks to Panama and the results of
their subsequent stay as permanent residents.
The anti-slavery movement succeeded in its persistent

efforts but the defeated landowners challenged the outcome
with measures which would make slaves' life as difficult as
before.

Great Britain abolished slavery on April 17, 1832.

This decision did not reach the West Indies until 1834, during which the Parliamentary Council approved the measure of

Freedom by Order.

Thus, on August 1 of that year, the slaves

were freed and a system of apprenticeship was introduced by
the Emancipation

Act."^"

The British government had to develop a plan which would

meet the demands of both groups pressuring it--the anti-sla-

very movement and the West-Indian planters.
opposed each other in essence.
tion of slaves.

These two groups

One, required the emancipa-

The other, alleged slavery as essential to

the sugar production system.

Already with the declaration

of the abolition of slavery, the movement which favored the

measure was satisfied in principle.

The true problem was

z

to satisfy the planters.

Sugar production had to continue

to be profitable in spite of
abolition.

The only way this

could be achieved was to establish
a work wage system that
would employ free labor. 2 Realizing
that such a transition
would be too drastic, the anti-slavery
leaders believed that
a system of apprenticeship
would smooth the transformation.
The law which freed the slaves
compelled them to serve
an apprenticeship of up to twelve
years.
It was later reduced to less time.
They would be paid in wages and were

responsible for their own upkeep.

They were required to pay

from their wages twice

a

of their own freedom.

The British government granted the

year,

a

portion towards the price

planters approximately from $15 to $20 million pounds in loans
which were to be redeemed by the slaves, not the planters.
These concessions were made so as to maintain the support
of the colonists and West-Indian merchants which depended upon immediate compensation in order to c^rry out the emanci-

pation program. 3
The administration in Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad

had many difficulties in reaching a common agreement to re-

structure the Colonial government in the aftermath of emancipation.

These islands now faced economic disaster.

governor was able to come with a feasible solution.

No
To com-

pound the problem, the planters in their disappointment tried
to obstruct in every way possible the rules imposed almost

overnight. 4

This lack of unity contributed to the restive-

4

ness of the former slaves who, unable to
earn their living,
had to work for a miserable wage. They
hoped at first to buy
land, but reality changed their dream into
a nightmare.
L*nd
prices were too high and a heavy investment was
necessary in

order to make the fields productive.

Another problem for the freed slaves was the overpopulation of all the islands.

For example, Barbados, with 166

square miles, had to support

population of 193,000 which

a

gave a density of 1,163 to the square mile.

5

Table

I

indi-

cates the density for the other islands.

TABLE

Population
1850

I

Density"*"

Barbados
British Guayana
Grenada
Guadaloupe
Tobago
Trinidad

1,163 per square mile.
"
"
1,700 "
665
442
241
229

The Nep;ro in the Caribbean
Eric Williams.
Washington D.O.: 1942.
I

"

"

"
"

.

A census in 1851 gave the population of Barbados as

135,939 with the following classifications:
15,824

Whites
Colored & half-castes

Blacks

.

.

.

.30,059

90,056

was
The labor market was overstocked, and the land

scarce and high priced.

Nevertheless, small proprietors of

1830's to 1851, from
less than five acres increased, from

^

.

5

1,100 to 3,537.

Overcrowded conditions tended to keep the

laboring population in

a

subservient position.

sions of emancipated blacks created

a

The profes-

kind of middle class

composed of small landed proprietors, mechanics, merchants,
clerks, businessmen and artisans.

They were reluctant to

become wage earners on the plantations which they considered

tyrannical

.

Trinidad in 1851, counted 69,000 inhabitants.

In 1858,

there were 80,000, of which 50,000 were Creoles of African

descent.

After the emancipation, the planter established

a

system of lower wages and more work for the freed field workers.

This did not have favorable results for the freed blacks,

as a high percentage of field laborers had become small land-

owners who worked on the plantations on a part time basis
to complement their income.

The wage system provoked them

to bring up their children as traders or mechanics.

Jamaica's socio-economic conditions were more outstandl
ing than those of the other islands.

Three different cen-

suses placed the black population at 380,000 in 1834, at

361,657 in 1844, and at 350,000 in 1860.
slaves were liberated.

320,000

Only 45,000 of them had any educa-

tion and formed a group of tradesmen.

engaged in the tillage of the soil.
the small proprietors.

In 1834,

In 1860,

50,000 of them were

These figures include

20,000 worked for the su-

gar estates; 10,000 as domestics and 3,000 in the public

works

7

6

As it appears, the desire for
social mobility, which

was common to these large
populations of West-Indian Blacks,
proved their ability to survive
the slave status and to look
for a better opportunity as soon
as they were emancipated.
It was not an easy goal to achieve.
So far, the socio-economic conditions constituted by their
environment was an almost insurmountable obstacle. The w ages we
r e lo w,

and the

work was exhausting, most of all for the children
who, instead of receiving good education, had to go to the
fields
as soon as possible.

The reasons of migration are easily understood after
the study of the conditions that preceeded and followed e-

maneipation.

The emphasis in the three islands of greater

population does not exclude the others:

British Guaya.na.

Tobago, Grenada and

The emigration from these islands was less

in number, but showed the same trends as in the others.
It was very difficult for the planters and the white

population as
slaves.

a

whole, to accept the emancipation of their

It was much more difficult to accept the freed men

as part of their society.

Race distinctions were perhaps

more strictly observed now that the black man was also

a Eri-

cs

tish subject.

At best, there were some colonists who felt

that the blacks owed them everlasting gratitude for having

been granted their freedom.

Others, the majority, who ulti-

mate purpose was to maintain the status-quo in spite of e-

mancipation, employed the system of lower wages to obtain

7

more work from the freed field workers.

This strategy con-

tributed to keeping the laboring population in

a

subservi-

ent position.
Once they had achieved emancipation, the freed men had
no knowledge of any occupation other than working the soil,

one of the objectives of the apprenticeship system was to

train the former slaves in different trades so as to prepare
them to be more independent.
a more

Another reason was to supply

diversified labor force.

Unfortunately, the system

of apprenticeship did not meet its expectations, although

there was

a

great increase of persons engaged in trades and

mechanical arts.

Perhaps it was precisely such increase

which discouraged the continuation of innovation as more freed
men were reluctant to become wage earners on the plantations,

causing

a

large deficiency of field labor.

This was espe-

Q

cially true of Barbados and Trinidad.

In Jamaica,

the last

colony to abolish slavery in 1833, the apprenticeship period
was drastically reduced to four years by the planters, leaving approximately 320,000 freed men without any preparation
or training.

Of the British West-Indies, Jamaica had the

lowest percentage of freed men in the trades or service occupation; the overwhelming majority engaged in field work.

10

an
The system of apprenticeship gave the government

the
excuse to postpone indefinitely the establishment of

popular education programs.

In Jamaica for example, no con-

education.
siderations had been made about popular

In 1860,

.

8

only 20,000 students, less
the 6* of the total population,
were enrolled in private school.
The planters were responsible for the faults of policy and
government which, besides
keeping the population in ignorance
through the flat discouragement of education, hopelessly confronted
a bankrupt
eco-

nomy that drove the Creoles from the
plantations.
In Barbados and Trinidad, there was an established
system of education although its deficiency helped to "prevent
the circulation of general intelligence u11
On the whole,

Macks

under the system of apprenticeship, the

did not really learn to develop self-reliance in sol-

ving their own problems.

Unfortunately, the public instruc-

tion system did not help them uphold their interests. 12
The freed man remained in his marginal status although he

now was a British citizen.

Another major obstacle to the smooth transition to e-

mancipation was the economic situation with which the colonies were confronted.

The colonists held the abolition of

the slave system responsible for the bankrupcy of their eco-

nomy.

However, ^11 were faced with

tuation.

a

difficult economic si-

Moreover, the sugar production monopoly which the

British colonies enjoyed, had been successfully challenged
by the growth of beet sugar in the French province of Landes,
and cane sugar in other French West Indies colonies and Cuba.

Other factors such ^s the slave system itself, made the colonial economy*

s

recuperation impossible.

This was partly due

9

to the high costs of the slave
system.

In Jamaica,

approx-

imately 200 sugar estates had been
abandoned due to debt and
lack of capital, as far back as 50
years before emancipation
had taken place. Absenteeism was an
important deterrent for
a profitable business. The
exportations of sugar had
decreas

from 150,000 tons in 1805 to 85,000 tons in
1833.
exports also suffered a loss of 50% from 1814
ed

Coffee

to 1832.

More,

over, from 1815 to 1850, the price of- sugar fell
approximate,
ly 75?S. 13 The persistent lack of capital after
emancipation

contributed to an unceasing depression which made it almost

impossible to continue production, much less to pay freed
labor.

To avoid the latter,

an effort was made to encourage

the Hindu Coolie immigration to replace the new small land-

owners in the sugar fields.
crease in unemployment and

Such immigration caused an ina

decrease in the part-time em-

ployment in which most of the freed laborers engaged to com-

plement their income during the 1840'

s.

In Barbados and Trinidad, the planters followed a mist

taken policy by refusing to give any inducement for the la-

borer to remain in the fields, such as higher wages or
more liberal land tenure.

1^

a

They preferred to recruit cheap

labor from other parts of the British empire.
Consequently, there was an influx of East Indian Coolies
who came to replace the freed laborers on the field.

their

3

After

year indenture period, the Coolies successfully com-

peted against the freed field workers as they underbid the

10

blacks in daily wages.

Although only l/12th of the fertile

land was under cultivation, the reticent landed oligarchy
refused the concession of land to freed men as had been done
in Jamaica."^

Overpopulation also affected the island's economy.

The

freed black had very little chance to attain economic secu-

rity in the West Indies.

Under the circumstances, he could

not satisfy even his primary necessities.

The black man

was forced to emigrate to look for higher salaries.

Secondary reasons for emigration were the political situation in the islands and

a

society which did not allow up-

ward social mobility for the freed men.^
On December 12, 1846, the United States signed the Ma-

llarino-Bidlack Treaty with New Granada's Liberal government which guaranteed the latter 's sovereignty in the Isthmus in exchange for the unlimited rights to transit across
the territory.

This agreement was beneficial to

a

politi-

cally weak Colombia, as it would no longer have to contend

with the continuous threats of the Panamanian separatist
These motions toward autonomy had been taking

movements.

place in Panama not only as a reaction against the unceasing

party conflicts which caused
but also as
sought for

a
a

a

political crisis in Colombia,

manifestation of patriotic feelings which
corresponding political structure.

16

Panama

occassions:
separated from New Granada on three different

September 26, 1830, July

9,

1831, and November 18, 1840.

7

11

Although the

IftthmUfl

rejoined

a

peaceful Hew Granada Decem-

ber 31, 1841, its leaders did not abandon their goal of

ri

n

independent Panama.
The 1846 negotiations assured the United States of an

advantageous position in Panama over the British for the

acquisition of control of the interoceanic waterways.

The

contract included regulations concerning navigation, commerce,
and the "neutrality and maintenance" of the free transit

through the Isthmus, which decisively favored the United
States.

Additionally, the government had the right to de-

vise and establish whichever means of communication it esteemed most convenient.

Without doubt, this contract

would deeply affect Panama's socio-economic structure in
the succeeding years.

After its war with Mexico, from 1846 to 1843, the United States annexed the territory known as California and

came into possession of Oregon, thus fulfilling in great

part its goal of Manifest Destiny.

In 1848,

the settlement of the Northwestern boundary,

shortly after
a

Swedish ad-

venturer named John August Sutter, discovered gold in Callbeginning the Gold Rush.

The distance between the settled

states, especially those undergoing industrial development,

inaccessible parand the new possessions, made the latter

ticularly for administrative purposes.

1

The water route

long and time-consuming.
to California via Cape Horn was too
as the most conveNorth Americans again looked upon Panama

nient crossroad by which the United States
might achieve
rapid communication between its east and west
boundaries.
As a result, sudden and uncontrolled wave of
foreigners in-

vaded Panamanian soil.
The excessive human traffic through the Isthmus demanded

the organization of steamship lines.

The United States

Congress quickly authorized contracts for the establishment
of two steamship companies which would connect the east and

west coast of North America through Panama.

George Law and

William H. Aspinwall took charge of the organization of the
routes.

The steamship Falcon serviced the Atlantic Coast

from the ports of New York and New Orleans to the Chagres
River.

The Pacific route was covered by the steamship Cal -

ifornia from California and Oregon to Panama City.

The Isth-

mus became again the compulsory stop for the goldiggers.

demand for coast to coast land transportation,
18
food and lodging, services which became very well paid.
The California Gold Hush gave new life to the Isthmus

There was

a

which had become poor and obscure due to the unceasing civil
wars in their struggle for autonomy from Colombia.

In the

years preceeding 1840, the Panamanian economy had experienced
a

grave depression.

The presence of the foreign element con-

tributed to the improvement of such situation.

The rundown

appearance of Panama City changed completely in less than
Old houses were restored and new ones were built
four years.
the quiet
Foreigners from all parts of the world disrupted

13

atmosphere that had been characteristic of the Panamanian
setting.

Although the contact with the foreigners was ex-

clusively "based on a business level, it brought to the surface racial and cultural differences.

Such dissimilarities

caused animosity among Panamanians against the newcomers who
spoke a different language and who mocked the native costumes,
customs, and religious expression.

19

Another reason for the

Panamanian attitude towards the foreigners was due to the
fact that those who had come in the Pal con

1

s

first voyage,

introduced the 'cholera morbus' in the seaport of Cruces in
1848.

The lack of sanitary conditions due to the uncontroll-

ed massive immigration,

caused the disease's rapid propagation

throughout the Isthmus, resulting in an epidemic.
On December 28, 1848, New Granada granted

a

concession

a railto the Pacific Steamship Company for the building of

road across the Isthmus of Panama.

A contract was drafted

Chauncey, wouldin 1849 between John Lloyd Stephens and Henry
and the governbe organizers of the Panama Railroad Company,
hardpressed for time as
ment of Colombia. The builders were
any record of past
surpassing
were
endeavours
Rush
Gold
the
means of transporThe demand for a new and faster
output.
Such
a railroad a necessity.
of
building
the
made
had
tation
force which Panama was
labor
large
a
demanded
construction

unable to supply.

began to
Those in charge of recruitment

to the Isthmus.
promote the immigration of labor
Company hired one thousand
Railroad
Panama
the
In 1850,

14

Chinese from C a nton to start work on the construction of the
line.

However, due to illness, chronic melancholy and other

factors such as their addiction to opium, the Chinese' stay
in Panama was of short duration.

This first group of immi-

grants was prejudicial to the Company as the majority deserted their work on the railroad as often as possible and "had
to be rounded up by the police and sent back to work". 20

Those who were in charge of the construction, Misters Trauwine and Totten, made

a

contract with the Royal West Indian

Fail Steam Packett Company so that it would transport large

numbers of laborers from the Caribbean to Panama for

a

mini-

mal fee.

The demand for paid labor in Panama offered very good
The unfavor-

opportunities, especially to the West Indians.

able situation which they confronted in their respective isProm being

lands induced their immigration to the Isthmus.

farmers and rural people, they became laborers in construction and industry,

a

change which they welcomed.

The West

Indian migrant laborer proved to have better work capacity
than the Chinese.

Although W©st Indians found

a

different

opporpolitical organization in Panama, the socio-economic
in their
tunities which it offered were much better than

places of origin.
began in August of 1850
The construction of the railroad
workers gathered from
with a labor force of three hundred
Germany, Austria, the West
France,
England,
India,
Ireland,

15

Indies, Colombia, Costa Rica and
Panama.

Pour months later,

the number of employees had risen
to more than one thousand.
The labor force continued to increase
during the four years
of construction, from 1850 to
1854, as it had during the first
four months.
The total working force was seven thousand men
by the completion of the construction.
Although the West

Indian group was not numerically important, it proved to
be
the most adaptable to the climatic and working conditions.
As other groups of immigrants decreased due to illness, the

Vest Indians replaced them. 22
At the beginning of the railroad construction in 1850,

the Colombian Conservative President had been replaced by

a

Liberal whose platform included, specifically, opposition
to the continuation of slave traffic that had been favored

by the former government in spite of emancipation.

attitude did not mean

a

This

radical change towards the incorpor-

ation of black people into the social structure of Panama.

Although the initiative to open the doors to West Indian

immigration in Panama was in the United States' hands

.

The

local attitudes made it clear that these immigrants, like the
others, had to restrict their ambitions.

The West Indians

soon sensed this opposition and isolated themselves in order
to protect their traditions and language.

'

Besides, many

who thought to establish themselves as tradesmen, joined

others who considered Panama as

a

transitory home where they

could earn some money to buy land in their own country.

16

The principal handicap was not color nor race but lan-

guage.

As they spoke English, it was impossible for them to

send their children to the Panamanian public schools which,

aside from this inconvenience, were considered inferior to
the British system.

The community organized private schools.

Another handicap was the loyalty of these immigrants to their

British costumes. The Panamanians interpreted this attitude
ac resistance to the national institutions, norms and speech. ?4

Finally, this first generation of Vest Indian immigrants
had left one chaotic political situation for another.

The

high wages they were enjoying cane from North American companies, thus, their interest was to work as much as possible
and,

for the moment,

to put aside any close contact with

Panamanians and their society.
In

spite of the United States' priority over the Isth-

mian traffic and its means of transportation, New Granada
granted

a

concession to Prance for the building of the Pa-

nama Canal in 1876.

In 1800,

the building concession was

transfered to Count Ferdinand D'Lesseps, who had also brought
the rights to the Panama Railroad Company.

both properties into one Company,
du Cnnal Interoceanique

,

He later merged

the Compaignie Universelle

which declared itself bankrupt in

180?. Five years later in 1034,

a

private French Company

to the
named Cornpai^nie Nouvelle acquired all the rights
latter was organized
Prench Canal project until 1904. The

mainly for the purpose of securing

a

25
buyer of the assets.

17

The first company accepted workers from the W st Indies
e

because they had proven to he more adaptable than other migrant laborers during the railroad construction.

operations (construction)

a

During its

second massive West Indian immi-

gration took place in Panama, affecting again the numerical
as well as the racial composition of the Isthmus.

Jamaica

was the chief source of labor supply followed by Barbados,
St.

Lucia and Martinique.

high proportion of

V.'est

The following figures indicate the

Indian workers:

in 1884, more than

half of the 19,000 workers employed by the Panama Canal Comp?ny or the Compai^nie Universelle were West Indians.

In

1885, among 12,875 laborers under contract, 9,000 came from

Jamaica.

In 18888,

out of 22,000 workers, 19,800 originated

from the West Indies.

B e cause of the economic disaster due

to the Canal Company's bad administration,

the cholera and the

D'Lesyellow fever that killed about 16,000 workers, compelled

sep B to abandon his project.

When the French Company failed,

Those
many immigrants returned to their native countries.
adapt their living conwho chose to remain in Panama tried to
They found jobs in
life.
of
way
country's
host
the
to
ditions
Others, engaged in subsistent agriculthe railroad company.
acquired along the railroad
had
they
farms
small
the
ture in
communities for farming
Still others, moved to rur*l
line.
them.
and gradually became part of

Bunau-Varilla formed a
Another Frenchman, P h illi?pe
enterprise until he
canal
the
of
charge
take
company, to

18

was able to mastermind the treaties by which all
the rights
to

the railroad and canal project passed to the government

of the United States.

This development was not a surprise,

Having gained an unusual strategic position in the Caribbean after the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States

needed

a

canal.

In 1902,

that nation's Congress passed the

Spooner Act, authorizing the purchase of the rights and assets from the new French Company, and the negotiation of

treaty with Colombia.

a

A proposed canal treaty signed by the

United States and Colombian foreign ministers, John Hay and
Dr. Thomas Herran in 1903 was rejected by the Colombian con-

gress on the grounds that it was
ereignty.

a

menace to national sov-

Hoping to take advantage of the situation, the

Panamanian State Assembly decided to make Colombia's veto the
immediate cause for declaring national independence.

Corres-

pondingly, the United States offered its support to the Pa-

namanian cause in exchange for the would-be nation's approval of

a

treaty similar to the Eerran-Kay.

Panama claim-

ed its national autonomy from Colombia on November 3, 1903.

In the meantime, Phillippe Bunau-Varilla worked out his treaty,

independently of the Panamanian delegation already in Washington and succeeded in imposting his views
As

a

anc!

conditions.
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result, in 1904, the French transferred the rights of

exchange
the concession to the United States government in
for $40,000.00.
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The new administration of the Canal
took advantage of
the presence of 700 West Indian workers
who had been under

contract to the French companies for the
construction of the
canal and the maintenance of the railroad.
Immediately, la-

bor recruiting agents started to import other workers
from
different countries. The following census taken in
1906 gives
the origin and numbers of those workers:

Spaniards
-reeks
Italians
Colombians
West Indian
In 1910,

S
!

222.^

lJlOo!
2,000.
1,500.
3o)oOo!

there were 5,000 Europeans and 28,000 West

dians working on the canal.

In 1913,

In-

at the peak of employ-

ment, there were 44, 711 unskilled workers, about 40,000 of

which were West

I n dians.

J

Unlike the French administration,

the North Americans established distinctions related to sal-

aries, lodging, and medical services between white United

States citizens and unskilled Europeans and West Indians.
The first group was paid in gold, enjoyed comfortable housing and good medical care.

The second group was paid in sil-

ver and received second class medical attention.

In spite of

its inferior quality and conditions, the housing facilities

available, could not meet the silver employees' demand.

Some

governors of the Canal Zone like Chester Harding and M.Li

Walker petitioned Congress to increase living quarters for the
employees of the Can^l Zone.

However, on the whole, it seemed

the resthat the North American Canal administration shunned
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ponsibility of providing decent shelter for the
workers,
leaving it to the Panamanian government. This
attitude
indirectly opened the way to the exploitation of the workers by the owners of tenement housing in the country.

rents were sky-rocketing.

The

The poor sanitation facilities

created numerous health problems for the West Indians living
in Panama which also contributed to the atmosphere of op-

position to the country.

When Congress was close to grant-

ing $1,300,000 for a project to house 16,000 workers and

their dependents in the Canal Zone in 1916, the Panamanian
landlords, by lobbying in Washington D.C., were able to

bury that bill on the pretext of the loss of prospective
income from the immigrants' rents. 30
As the building of the Canal was coming to an end,

some workers had to be laid off.

The administration offer-

ed to pay all transportation and to guarantee repatriation,

if desired,

to those who had been v/orking for more than 500

labor days.

0n c e the excavations of Corte Culebra were fi-

nished in October 1913, about 10,000 West Indian workers
were laid off.

A^out 50% of them found work in the banana

plantations of the United Fruit Company in Pocas del Toro;
"^l

a

northwestern province of Panama/

The other 5,000 re-

mained in the terminal cities of Panama and Colon, hoping
would be preferto find jobs in the Canal Zone where they
red because they spoke English.

In the next chapter we will

the process
learn how being unemployed in Panama affected

21

of West Indians' integration into society.
Thus, the Canal had become a reality in spite of

history of complicated problems.

a

From then on, Panama

had to face not only North American interference but also

the consequences of

a

large group of West Indians, who had

decided to stay and take advantage of the benefits promised
them by the 1904 Constitution.

The transformation of the

Isthmus into an international crossroad gave it considerable importance and an opportunity to reaffirm its posi-

tion as an independent nation.

The participation of the

West Indians in the construction of the Canal was their

biggest contribution to Panama.

Nevertheless, in the years

to come they found little acceptance there.

.
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There are three facets which
immigrant groups and their
host societies undergo, in the
process of integration:
ac-

ceptance, adaptation and reaction.

The first warrants

a

certain degree of assimilation of the
customs of each group
involved.
The second, implies a combination of
the charac-

teristics of each culture in the social
attitudes of the
groups.
The third, may be manifested in the emergence
of

anti-transcultural movements, due to the social oppression
of the immigrant group, or the effects on both from
the ac-

ceptance of foreign cultural characteristics

1

An unusual experience occurred in Panama with its larg-

est group of immigrants, the West Indians.

was made in the process of acceptance.

Little progress

Adaptation proved

difficult, as the immigrants tried to preserve intact their
original cultural patterns, such as the folkloric traditions,
music, religion and to

a

lesser degree, their language.

The social integration of the W e st Indians became

a

problem

because, not wanting or being unable to 'absorb' the national culture, they chose to live outside of it.

other hand,
people,

a

On the

cultural phobia in the part of the Panamanian

created

a

permanent opposition to any foreign in-

fluence, inciting the defense of their culture rather than
race, against the possible effects on the language, customs
and ideas of the country.

After considering the viewpoints

of both groups at the end of the Canal construction, Chap-

ter II wil deal with the West Indian's integration within
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Panamanian Society in its socio-cultural

,

economic and

political aspects, respectively.
To immigrants the Isthmus offered the vision
of a

new country, but Panama, although undergoing a
stage of
transition, had already developed a personality of its
own.

Its culture was the result of Spanish traditions,

F r ench inspirations and some North American immitations.

The country's upper class reflected most fully these trends.
The lower class was composed of native blacks, Indians,

mulattoes and mestizos that found
Spanish culture.

a

common link in the

As a result, the latter was enriched with

the contributions received from the influx of these dif-

ferent groups.
The language, Spanish, also reflected the strong in-

fluence of foreign elements in the difference of pronunciation, word meanings and the anglicisms used among the

masses in Panama.
ligion.

Roman Catholicism was the official re-

However, its followers added some of their pagan

traditions to the religious rituals giving it

mysticism and superstition.

a

sense of

The country's artistic forms

of expressions were mostly af rican-inf luenced

,

especially

3
the folk dances such as the tamborito and cumbia.

The geographic location and history of Panama gave
and
its inhabitants contrasting feelings of submission

independence.

As a semi-isolated province of Colombia,

structure.
Panama preserved its social and rural family

.

.
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Once the first construction
period began in 18 5 0 such structure underwent many unforseen
changes.
The struggles to separate from Colombia were legendary.
Nevertheless entanglements with other nations, especially
the United States, fostered a passive acceptance of
economic and political dependence, and generated a condlict
of national identification.
The Panamanians were able to accept
some immigrants
such as the French and Spaniards with
whom they had much in
common.
Their latin culture and language made them welcome.

However, their Hispanic social structure was challenged
by
the West Indians, the most numerous but not necessarily
ho-

mogeneous groups of immigrants.
W e st Indians also had a cultural personality of their

own.

On a racial level,

great meaning for them.

sensitivity to shades of color had
Due to their social differences,

the island of origin caused many frictions, most of all bet-

ween Barbadians, Jamaicans and Trinidadians

4

These internal

conflicts were obstables towards unity against the injustices
they had to face.

Although different among themselves,

a

common name would be legally assigned to them; "Antillanos"
The Vest Indians believed that this designation in the civil registry made them second class citizens in their ef-

forts to become permanent residents of Panama.
As

a

consequence, West Indians immigrants felt inse-

cure as Panamanians.

They drew strength from grouping to-

gether and reaffirming their British-based social and cul-

^
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tural heritage.

They prided themselves in
being British
citizens and remained loyal to
that government. Unfortunately, the indifferent attitude
of the British whites
toward their black compatriots
placed the West Indian community in Panama at a disadvantage.
The white English advocated the custom of racial discrimination,
injuring the
loyal black citizens who, often times,
expressed their willingness to defend the British Empire 'with
their lives if
necessary
1

.

In 1904, Panamanians had accepted W st Indians and
e

through their constitution, had given them the opportunity
to become citizens.

Panamanians interpreted the West In-

dians affinity to England as an indication of their contempt for local norms.

They had witnessed through the years,

the subordination of W e st Indians as human beings and as

employees of the Panama Canal Company in spite of having
a

double social standard in the Canal Zone.

West Indians

preferred the United States rule to the Panamanian because
it offered better economic conditions for the time being.

For example, in 1938, the Panama Canal W e st Indian Employees

Association (P.C.V/.I.E. A.

)

requested that they be consi-

dered "de facto" citizens of the United States though not
''de

jure", in view of the services rendered to the Panama

Canal Zone Government.

'

Now that they were living in Pa-

nama, they isolated themselves from the Panamanians.

Lo-

yalty to England, preference for the United States and I-
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solation from Panamanians affected W e st Indians in

a

nega-

tive way in different levels such as: Their children's edu-

cation, their position as workers within the country's la-

bor force and in the Canal Zone, as well as their legal status within the Isthmus.

This study will concentrate later

on the legal aspects provoked by West Indian attitudes.

Education was
solation.

a

factor contributing to W e st Indian i-

In the Canal Zone their children received a se-

cond-rate education which prepared them for the local job

openings for blacks.
a

The schools did not provide them with

professional training until 1946, when two vocational

schools were opened for blacks.
W e st Indian children did not learn about Panamanian

history or geography in any public schools.

g

The families

who lived in Panama did not send their children to public

schools; instead,

they enrolled them in small private ones

which were usually sponsored by various churches.

They

were taught English, history and geography, the pound system and how to count British currency with complete lack of
9
concern that they were residing in Panama.

Although their

schools were deficient, the educated immigrant played an

important role in the field of education in Panama.
Indians established private tutoring as
for learning English.

a

West

popular method

As early as July 12, 1893, Samuel T.

private school in CoBailey founded the first West Indian
In
Christ Church.
It was named Parochial School in
lon.
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In 1904, Dr. J.T. Barton founded the
Panama Private Academy
at Plaza Herrera,

for

a

in Panama city, where evening classes

commercial school were also held.

The concept of

the private school system was later readily adopted by

Panamanian educators.
Language was an important obstacle to rapid integration.

Neither the Canal Zone Schools nor the private

schools taught Spanish.

Inability to speak Spanish Pre-

vented V e st Indian children from attending the country's

public schools.

The tradition of organization, sociabi-

lity or social behavior, family life and the practice of
Chritian principles to which they had been subjected during the British Colonial administration in the West Indies,
were very much in contrast with those of Panama.

As would

be expected, both groups considered themselves far removed

from each other's ethnic, religious and linguistic natures.

Traditionally, belonging to

a

solidly established

'God-fearing' family was very important to the
As a restricted immigrant group,

very much affected.

10

V/est

Indians.

their family relations were

An inbalance in sex ratio promoted

marriage with Panamanian women.

An imbalance in ages caused

problem between the immigrant generation and their children
because of the lack of

a

middle age and young adult con-

tingency in an already top heavy age pyramid.

11

Both of

ways of life
these imbalances, couple with the contrasting
overpowered the traand social structure of the Isthmus,
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ditional W e st Indian family patterns.

Parents

"born,

in

the islands found it almost impossible to maintain
their

culture.

Thier children were socially marginal and lack-

ed identification with either culture.

John and Mavis

Biesanz have summed up the W e st Indian youth's identification conflict:
(The young W e st Indian) scorns his parents' Union
Jack and Royal family... admired Eing Crosby, lena
Home and American material culture ... likes the
free and easy Panamanian life and its comparative
racial mobility. (He) has little sense of patriotism (and) feels he belongs nowhere. 12

Lack of advanced education led to

a

negative personal

attitude and social behavior of young West Indians.

In

1955, the Biesanzs reported that this group was very in-

clined towards promiscuity, which resulted in an illegiti-

macy rate of approximately 71%.
There were four commonly practiced family models a-

mon^ Vest Indians.

Less than 25% of the marriages were

monogamous, had some degree of economic stability such as
a

house or plot of land, and rigidly observed Christianity,

yore than 25% lived in faithful concubinages.

There was

also the maternal or grandmother family, where the mother's

parents assumed the role of the child's father.
form was call the 'keeper family',

a

The last

superficial or un-

in which the
stable relationship between the parents,
Although
mother worked to help support the children.
'

responsibility of
most men shunned the legal and economic
to get married after achiev
likely
more
were
they
a family,

^
33

ing some economic security, than their Panamanian counterparts.

'

(See Table II).

The differences in social classes among West Indians

derived from occupational and behavioral factors.

The up-

per class consisted of professional people who had

a

high

social status in the islands, the educated blacks, who

became professionals and looked for positions in the various government offices, ministers of the established
churches,

journalists and teachers.

Indians who enjoyed

a

Those British West

high social status back home, strove

to be equally accepted as members of Panamanian society.

The middle class included church and lodge leaders

who were loyal to their cultural and religious traditions
in spite of a low earning power.

They tried to give their

children at least high school education.

In many ways,

the middle-class blacks collaborated with the government

policies, as an obvious proof of achieving success through

persistent effort.

They believed that men of superior

character and ability could arrive at positions of power
without limitations as to race.

Their example persuaded

the group
working class blacks to accept the status nuo of
15 The lower class consisted of
within Panamanian society.
undisciplined.
menial laborers. Their way of life was
irresponsible in education
Most engaged in promiscuous and
gambling, horseracing,
but participated enthusiastically in
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or the lottery.
As a whole, due to their small
salaries, the W e st In-

dians realized that they would not be
able to provide for
their families in case of illness or death.
During the
early 1920' s, they organized fraternal and
benevolent societies, forming a cooperative security against
becoming a

public burden.

These organizations gave such positive re-

sults that they served as an incentive for the beginning of
the adaptation of

basis.

a

social security program on a national

The field of sports and music in Panama also re-

ceived substantial contributions from the West Indians,

whose deep religious convictions turned their churches into social centers for the provision of recreation,

educational

programs and musical expressions.

During the depression years, West Indians began to identify even more with North American ideals.

They tried

to be more economically active in order to acquire the com-

modities North Americans possessed in the Canal Zone, such
as clothes,

cars, etc.

Unfortunately, their 'image' suffered

in Panamanian society as they tried to immitate the other

intruder.

During the early 1900*

s,

some West Indians discon-

tinued their work, in the Canal Zone and moved into Panama
City and Colon on

a

permanent basis.

Many of them had left

their work, partly because of the severities of the laws to
which they were subjected there.

In turn, these workers

:

.

TABLE II

CARRIAGE PERCENTAGES FOR VEST INDIANS OVER 15
YEARS OP AGE IN THE CANAL ZONE AND PANAMA!
f

-CANAL ZONE

PANAMA

FEMALES
SINGLE:
MARRIED:

25%
50%

50%
23%

MALES

50%
43^

50%
20%

'

SINGLE:
MARRIED:
NOTE:

25%,

of blacks live in consensual union.

SOURCE:

John and Mavis Biesanz, The People of Panama (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1955), p. 316 (Based on 1940 Census figures )
.
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successfully sought employment as plumbers,
firemen, carriage and Trolley car conductors and
even as policemen in
the national territory. 18
Most West Indians did not take advantage of the
oppor-

tunity to acquire farm lands which Panamanian
law had made
available to immigrants. Although the majority had been
farmers in the islands, they preferred to live in the urban centers.

One explanation was that they had come to a-

void farm work for what it reminded them.

Another was that

land was not accessible to them as it was to other settlers. 15
Still more important, living in the cities allowed them to

maintain close contact with other West Indians, giving them
a

feeling of security and an opportunity to preserve their

customs and tradition.

After the completion of the Canal in 1914, the large
labor force employed during its construction was no longer
needed.

The Canal's maintenance work could not absorb the

31,000 West Indian workers.

Once more, victims of unemploy-

ment, these people faced the necessity of emigrating in

search of new jobs elsewhere or competing for them in Panama.

A number of them retired from the Canal Company and de-

cided to settle in Panama with their small disability payments.

M 0 st had lost family ties and friendships in their

20
islands of origin.

This situation caused

a

noticeable

increase of the population in the national territory, part-

icular^ in Panama City and Colon.

21

(See Tables No. Ill

.
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and IY).

The W e st Indians, now 'new* residents, represented
an antagonistic sector in the national process of revindi-

cation in the 1920'

Their lack of interest in the nation's

s.

problems had adverse consequences.
one would

"be

the development of

a

The most significant

persistently progressive

racist-oriented policy, most of all nurtured in the economicly powerful sectors of Panamanian society

"but

also in the

government, manifested especially through its legislative

measures 22

During the 1920'

s

and early 1930'

s

government officials

gave Vest Indians the opportunity to settle into vacant plots
of lands in the outskirts of the capital.

In doing so,

these

officials tried to make the 'Antillanos' presence less obvious in business centers.

Additionally, these politicians

defended the landlords' implicit agreement restricting availPueblo
able housing for these immigrants to certain areas in
:iuevo,.Rio Aba jo, Parque Lefevre and Ciudad Radial.

Although

other groups
the wooden houses had poor sanitary facilities
causing a substantially
of Canal Zone workers settled there,
territory.
important wave of migration into the national
acute when mass unemployWest Indian migration became more
Zone to make way for
ment took place in 1929 in the Canal
left jobless during the
were
who
citizens
American
North
25 The Canal Company's
States.
United
the
in
depression
was classified as dumping,
workers
their
for
concern
lack of

^

^

population
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since it forced the local unemployed
labor to turn to
and already overburdened host. 24

a

weak

Panamanian regarded West Indians as a threat to their
well-being and also began to hold them responsible
for the

national social ills. 25 Reacting to the national resentment
towards the West Indians, the government, which had proved
unable to provide jobs for its unemployed, used them as

'scapegoats
tion.

1

during the mid-1920

f

s,

to divert public atten-

Not withstanding the profits made from the W e st In-

dians as consumers and accessible cheap labor, the general

feeling was that only expulsion from the national territory
would solve the socio-economic situation.

The news media

contributed to reinforce this popular sentiment.

Typical

was an editorial in the Panama-Weekly in 1924, which queried
Ape we going to stand aside and permit an inferior unassimilable foreign element that is
objectionable from a sociological point of
view, to take advantage of the few jobs that
our native element could fulfill? 26
The West Indian immigrant incorporated himself to the

Isthmian economy as

a

consumer, the same way Panama had in-

corporated itself to the United States economy.

became

a

As panama

consumer market for the United States, it could

not offer sufficient job opportunities for then, as the rate
of unemployment in the Canal Zone rose.

Although the count-

1839-1903
rv had confronted this situation especially from
still did not
and from 1913-1915, the government officials
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attempt to establish programs of development in which the un-

employed immigrants and the national labor force could be integrated into the process of industrial growth.

On the con-

trary, they insisted on maintaining a service economy over-

whelmingly beneficial to the economicly powerful sectors in
the government.

Independently, an arbitrary system of gov-

ernment employment, further limited the

V.'est

Indian 'middle

1

or educated class as it rarely found occupational stability
in the public offices.

Panama developed disproportionally

.

The construction

and operation of the Canal reaffirmed the old national econo-

mic structure rather than helped its transformation.

Three

different factors perpetuated the traditional economy. First,
the economic system was designed to exploit the geographic po-

sition of the Isthmus since colonial times.

Now that the ca-

Second,
nal was finished, the profits would be unsurpassed.
high population
slow agriculture development, combined with

maintenance of the
increase, provided cheap labor for the
into the cities
Moreover, the exodus of small farmers
Canal.
lands in the hands
precipitated the concentration of fertile
Third, Panama
undistas )
(latif
families
plantation
of fewer
United States' production
the
for
market
consumer
a
became
even in principle.
surplus and could not compete
was one of economic ad1930,
to
1920
from
The period
work opportunities no
favorable
The
Par,ama.
justments for
employment was still high.
for
search
the
longer existed, but
.

.
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There were 467,459 inhabitants
according to the 1930 Census,
with a population increase rate of
4.7% (See Table V & VI).
Panama had 'secured' two new markets for
its domestic products after the construction period had
ended selling to
ships in transit and to the Canal Zone
itself.
Cnce the Canal Company established fully stocked post
exchanges, these
new markets slowly disappeared.
The Isthmus could not supply enough agricultural pro-

ducts for the rapidly growing population.

Although the ex-

portation of preserved meats rendered handsome profits, cattle owners did not improve or multiply their breeding stock
to meet

the steadily increasing demand.

Agricultural devel-

opment almost ceased as the economicly progressive chose to

concentrate on the service industries, while the fishing industry 'existed' practically for internal consumption pur,
27
poses

Changes in the general conditions in Panama, during the
1920'

s

Not be-

brought the West Indian question to surface.

ing able to find work in the Isthmus, Panamanian laborers

turned to the Canal Zone for employment.

H 0 wever,

the Pana-

ma Canal Company preferred the hiring of West Indians because

they were subjected to lower pay rates under the classification of 'silver roll' workers.

This policy incited the Pa-

Inde-

namanians to denounce them as dangerous competitors.
pendently, these 'competitors' thought of Panama as

a.

refuge

victims in the
from the discrimination of which they were

5
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TABLE V

DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION
BY RACE AND SEX

3?

i

esti 7,0
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,

70.813

i:egro

op ,S6.?
33
n

a fs
*

(

124,528
70

52.36

O ^K 1-

18.14

32,345

14.67

>

Indian

42,897

23,730

19,167

9.16

Mulatto

22 LUiZ

11,764

10,681

4,00

4,138

3,350

788

kOQ

22?,O60

I

Oriental

Total

I'.

•
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Source: Panama* Oficina del Censo.
de 1930.
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100. 00

Censo demografj
p.
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TABLE VI

TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION
ACCORDING TO PROVINCES AND POSITION HELD BY
EACH RACIAL GROUP
PROVINCE

I1ESTIZO

WHITE

NEGRO

INDIAN

I.IULATTO

IS. 95

4.04

39.61

32.19

3.55

1.66

76.76

5.71

6. 68

7.17

3.42

O.26

12.60

IO.13

45.98

26.51

2.97

1.72

61.30

20.51

3.37

12.81

I.83

.1°

11.59

50.86

5.19

.29

2. 27

.10

4.96

•25

2.86

.12

ORIENTAL

BCCAS:
15,851
CCCLS:
48 2kk
COLON:
51,161

CHIRI QUI:*
76,91^

1

13,391

31.22

HERRERA
31

,

050
•

72. 0

20.42

oO. 00

35.75

76.63

1^.43

44. 10

19, 23

L* SANTOS 1
*H.,2lG
•

59

VERAGUAS
6r,5

/,

-3

1.52

1.73

4.16

<3

2*0

1.12

9.52

1.80

faha:.a:

114,103
/

-

•

Source: Pa iip.r.ia.

:
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Canal Zone. 8

While many Est Indians were
put out of vork in 1929,
national labor representatives
continued to fight for equal employment opportunity for
Panamanians
in the Canal

Zone.

In the midst of economic depression
in 1936, an agreement was reached between Panamanian
officials and United States Secretary of State, Cordell
Hull, in which Panama was offered the advantage of having
its citizens enjoy
a

status of equality with the North Americans,
for employ-

ment in the C a nal Zone,

'when' or 'wherever'

feasible.

Thus

West Indians were further limited in work opportunities. 29
The restrictive economic measures concerning West In-

dians diminished their potential strength as the second

largest labor force in Panama and curtailed any open com-

petition from them in business or as workers.
No. VII).

These measures were largely responsible for the

lack of development of
1944,

(See Table

a

professional class among them.

In

there were only two doctors and three dentists of W e st

Indian descents.

Because of class distinctions, West Indians were unable
to cooperate as one group for economic purposes.

Feelings

of distrust, between one social class and the other, dis-

sipated their collective strength.

As

a

whole, middle class

West Indians engaged in the service enterprises.

They were

usually owners of tailershope, liquor and novelty stores,

beauty parlors, dry cleaners, dress makers and the like.

31

:
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TABLE VII

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OP THE TOTAL GAINFULLY
OCCUPIED POPULATION TEN YEARS OP AGE AND OVER
BY POPULATION CLASSES

TOTAL

MALE

FEMALE

All Classes: 207,718
Blacks
39,103

171,839

35,879

30,527

8,576

84.5

27. 0

Mestizos:

135,255

112,315

21,940

80.1

15. 8

29,162

23,982

5,180

83.1

20. 1

Others:

5,198

5,015

183

90.6

13. 8

Source:

George V/esterman.

White:

PERCENTAGE
M.

F.

West Indian Offsprings in Panama
A Study of Relationships between Ethnic and

Cultural Groups in a Cosmopolitan Setting
(Panama: 1944), p. 16

.

:
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The economic situation in Panama began to improve af-

ter 1937.

The need to defend the Canal in view of growing

worl-wide belligerancy created multiple work opportunities
and a period of relative prosperity.

The conflict between

Panamanians and West Indians did not subside as the Panama
Canal Company managed to persuade the National Legislature
to allow a fourth wave of these immigrant workers into the

country.

Aside from intensifying the socio-economic con-

flict, the unexpected immigration caused an acute shortage
of housing in the terminal cities.
a

The bonanza lasted for

few years, until 1945, and its aftermath was very dama-

ging both to the West Indian group and to the socio-economic and political conditions of the Isthmus.
As Panamanian increasingly considered them to be

a

ne-

gative factor or influence in the economic life of the Isthmus, the West Indians participation as an interest group

within the local social structure decreased.

integration as

a

West Indians'

socio-political interest group in Panama

did not take place,

and their participation in the nation-

al politics was minimal.

Constant mobility, economic in-

stability, and daily subordination by the Panamanian and
to maniITorth American cultures obstructed their ability

with the govfest themselves as a political interest group

ernment structure.
Porras'
Since the 191C's and beginning with BelisariQ
collaborated with
candidacy for President, black leaders
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conventional politicians.

They acted as intermediaries
bet-

ween the politicians they
represented and their community
in order to obtain its votes
during election time. Panamanian politicians were aware that
support or lack of it from
the V/est Indians community
could be a decisive factor in an
electoral turnout. 32 Nevertheless,
as a general rule, the
government did not take into consideration
the importance of
West Indians' participation in its
attempt to unify the Panamanian people against United States's
presence in the Canal
Zone.

Additionally, it never considered them in the country's

decision making process. 33

However, some interaction with,

and integration to the Panamanian mainstream did occur.

This

was manifested through the increase in enrollment of West

Indian offspring into the public schools.

In their study,

John and Mavis Biesanz assert that third generation Vest In-

dian children felt 'thoroughly Panamanian' and 'took their
•7 1

citizenship very seriously'.

*

Integration was also evi-

denced in the emergence of professional and, to
gree,

in political

a

small de-

participation on an individual basis.

From the beginning of its Republican period, in 1903,
Panama, waged a struggle of revindication against the inter-

ventionist role of the United States in the country's internal affairs and its 'occupation' of the Panama Canal
Zone.

Labor and student organizations, along with other

•politically progressive' groups, became the major spokesmen for the Panamanian cause while denouncing United States'
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aggressive intervention in the country's
affairs.
overexposed to the No rt h American way

Being

of life, not to men-

tion the subjects of an acute economic
domination, the
West Indian population as an interest
group did not understand or identify itself with Panama's
struggle of National liberation.

As such, they were obstacles to develop-

ing Panamanian nationalism.

This situation led to the per-

petuation of racist-oriented policies by the Panamanian
government.
The West Indians were a potentially important group

within the country's political situation, but their foreign
status counterbalanced their importance.

The Panamanian

commercial elite emphasized this last condition directly
and openly.

The United States foreign policy representa-

tives also made

a

point of it in

a

more subtle manner.

The

presence of the West Indian working force in Panama meant
the expansion of an internal market which in turn, increased
the commercial activities and the selling of services in the

hands of the national commercial elite.

On the other hand,

the superimposed presence of foreign labor force on its na-

tional counter part, guaranteed
of the

division and the weakening

a

'politicized' working masses in urban areas for the

United States.

J

The national commercial elites continuously underlined
the fact that W e st Indians were not only foreigners but

were also prohibited immigration

(

imnirracion prohibida)
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to keep them as consumers, not
as competitors.

In doing so,

they indirectly checked the industrial
development of the
country.
The economic sector principally benefited
from
the business made in the Canal and
Free Trade Zones.
Thus,
it was necessary to collaborate
with the North American gov-

ernment to protect its interests.

Article 136 of the 1904

Constitution granted the United States power to intervene
in the country's internal affairs.

Such 'privilege' was

excercised during presidential elections to 'guarantee an
orderly process'.

Gerardo Maloney and G e orge Priestly in

their work cn West Indian participation in national politics,
V.F. Goytia

(Panama:

(

Bio^ra.f ia de una Republics)

su historia y su presente)

ticipation as

a

,

,

Santiago Kontero

Z.

have classified such par-

breach of Panamanian sovereignity, as well

as sponsoring the continuation of power of the commercial e-

lites throughout the various so-called 'democratic adminis-

trations'.

Interventions such as

the

following demonstrate

that the United States contributed in checking Panama's insti-

tutional development:

Cn November 14, 1904, General Esteban

Huertas attempted to overthrow President Amador Guerrero.
The United States, through its Canal Zone government, de-

manded that the national government abolish its army and

establish a police force instead.

Excercising its rights

granted in the 1904 Constitution, the Canal Zone government
Jose D.
intervened in the 1908 electoral process to sponsor

Obaiafa's

presidency.

In 1914, United States established

)
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the border limits between Panama
and Costa Rica in its White

Agreement (Fallo-Whlte
f

ment (Fallo-Loubet).

nullifying Panama's previous agree-

As a result, Panama lost the Valle

of Talamanca and Coto regions.

That same year, United States

signed the Thorapson-Urrutia treaty with Colombia,
which es-

tablished border limits between Colombia and Panama.
latter, lost the Atrato River region to Colombia.

The

After

a

series of encounters between Panamanian police and North

American soldiers in the terminal cities, the United States

government issued

a

document (No. 245, October 15, 1916),

ordering the immediate disarmament of the Panamanian police
force.
too":

United States' occupation of Panama City and Colon

place in 1918 due to President Ciro Urriola's postpone-

ment of elections.

Also, from 1918-1920, United States

troops invaded and occupied the province of Chiriqui in order to

'protec' William Chase, a North American cilizen in-

volved in the assassination of Dr. Saturnino Perigault, governor of that Province.

37

The United States also intervened when the economic in-

terests of the national elites were at stake.

One case was

the mobilization of the United States troops to the national

territory to 'appease' two tenants' manifestations O'ovimientos IncuilinsriQg)

,

in 1925 and 1932,

against high rents.

the most
Of all the protester, the W e st Indian group was

affected.

Although their opposition to the issue at hand,

commercial characterwas expressed in terms of conflicting

.
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istics, Maloney & Priestly defined their
action with the

political term of "class struggle". 58
West Indians who achieved middle-class status were

considered community leaders.

They concentrated mainly in

improving their followers* buying power while emphasizing
their role as consumers.

These leaders did not attempt to

consolidate minority group consciousness among the West Indian population.

George W e sterman, Armando Fortune, Javier

Jimenez, and Maloney and Priestly, on the subject of West

Indian political participation, have accused them of sur-

rendering political loyalty in exchange for economic stability.

This group's failure to express itself as

a

unified

political group during thirty years of compulsory interaction with Panamanian society, made it vulnerable to the e-

mergence of

a

deep rooted reactionary nationalism whose ma-

jor exponent was Dr. Arnulfo Arias Madrid.

From 1936 to

194C, he expressed such nationalism in the drawing of a po-

litical platform that was later interpreted as being

a

doc-

trine or theory which totally rejected the West Indians as

undesirables
Once the 'Panamenista

1

program, as it was called, had

been legislated through the enactment of the 1941 Constitution, the W e st Indians were divided about its significance.
The majority considered the charter to be the final expre-

ssicn of the unfair treatment they had received, of their

ostracism
economic and social oppression and of political
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due to race.

Others wanted to reaffirm their native
citi-

zen's status to prove that they were
as Panamanians as the
rest.
On the whole, there was widespread
demoralization
among V/est Indians, as was seen through
their restlessness,

poverty,

juvenile delinquency and crime. 39

The social behavior and traditions of the islands,
were not only transferred to Panama but, as we have seen,

were inculcated upon the immigrants' Panamanian-born children,

in spite of the changes they suffered.

Rather than

being an incentive for the development of their descendants'
favorable attitude toward the traditions of their country
of birth,

the West Indian parents were largely responsible

for their children's total lack of identification to both

cultures.

^

Actually, the radical difference between the

two cultures, made the process of adjustment difficult and

slow as we have tried to show.

Whereas, the West Indian

did not. make good use of the early positive attitude of

Panamanians for social interaction.

The latter, distrust-

ful of the former's cultural disparity, proceeded to cur-

tail its total assimilation.

The Panamanian government always lacked interest for
the establishment of programs such as in education, designed

to absorb the various immigrant groups into the national

community.

Consequently, the first generation of immigrants

experienced conflict and disorganization.

In general, not

limitations
only Panamanian society imposed certain social

'
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for West Indians but also the foreign interests that were
and are still

active in the country.

These factors contri-

buted to reduce the development or unification of the nations's interest groups as an anti-imperialist force, in-

cluding the West Indians, which had been systematically subjected to and affected by the United States economy. 41
Some writers have been aware of the reaction of West

Indians to acculturation.

At the same time, they have under-

lined the attitude of the government towards these immigrants

George W e sterman acknowledges the peculiar situation of the
group that strengthened by its convictions of being superior, would not accept a complete integration, in spite of

the advances offered by Panama.

ginning of

a

He underlines also, the be-

systematic opposition to West Indians.

First,

as an immitation of the treatment given to them by North

Americans and second, as
nation.

a

means to create

a

homogeneous

However, it is important to stress that Westerman

looks at the Antillanos too favorably considering them more
as victims than as people who contributed to their own per-

secution.

Felipe Escobar defends the right of any nation to

dictate its immigration policy.

Nevertheless, he criticizes

as an anti-democratic procedure,

the consideration of West

Indians as representatives of

a

different and inferior race

much to the country'
and not as those who had contributed so
gov
Melendez explains the position of the

economy.

Prospero

problem created by the
eminent as the right answer to the

.
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West Indians.

Their dedication for many years to

country, unabled them to be

a

a

foreign

living force in the country,

unabled them to he a living force in the country of their
choice.

Moreover, he explains how North American's lack of

concern for them, once they were no longer useful, created
a

problem for Panama, as their presence was

a

great burden

for the welfare institutions to which they had not contri-

buted.

Maloney and Priestly insist mostly on the laboring

influence of West Indians.

They argue that in Panama, the

trend was to ignore their presence and importance on account
of their close relations to North American policy.

It would

take a long time to arrive at an official recognition or their

values as voters but they had to sacrifice their political

participation in exchange for economic stability.

•'

This variety of criteria stresses the profile that can
be drawn from this chapter.

As an uprooted conglomerate,

They had changed

the West Indians had to make a choice.

hands.

England had given them, together with their free-

dom, a distinct cultural background.

The economic depen-

dence on the United States obliged them to silence their

relation to England and to partake of

a

new system of values.

was
This created an isolation in front of the country who

working.
the owner of the same zone where they were

The

chapter will
future appeared very uncertain, as the next

indicate

1

,
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CHAPTER III
TRE LEGAL STATUS OF WEST INDIANS
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Until 1926 the religious and political tolerance
which
had characterized Panama served as an
incentive for immigration, especially from 1850 to 1904.
The excessive flow
of

people in transit and these who had gone to work
on the rail
road, gave the appearance that racial, religious,
social or

political discrimination did not exist.

However, as early

as 1S42 there were regulations imposed which
affected black

immigration.

At that tine, its purpose was to check the im-

portation of slaves.

As

Hack settlement

increased, Panama-

nian officials strongly believed that the risk was "being
fun that the ethnic differences would become stronger than

national feelings". 1
A.side from contradicting Panama's official stand,

as

well as that of other nations, racial discrimination 'backed
by legislative measures, was

nity.

a

serious offense to human dig-

In his BOCio-duridtc study of immigration, Nicolas

Pelgado states that Panamanian legislation since the beginning of the twentieth centiry was very specific about immigra
tion in certain aspects, 5ut showed no concern in others.

Immigrants had to settle fn Panama with their families in
They would not

order to be considered permanent residents.

enjoy full civil or political rights even as citizens.

They

could not voice their opixions nor participate in national

politics.

blish

a

On the other Y.m?

process to find

*

,

the legislation did not esta-

common basis for

a

smooth coexis-

diftence between ethnic and native groups, in spite of the

re

ferences in language, customs or
set of goals.
According
to Delgado, this policy
contributed to the corruption and
demoralization in the Public Administration. 2

Unfortunately, he did not expound on the
important aspect of
legal racial discrimination and its
implications for Panama's international image.
Felipe Escobar and George Westerman seem
to agree on the
fact that racial prejudice and discrimination
was not
a

Pana-

manian characteristic in principle, but was developed
after
the French end North Americans 'intorduced' it during
the

construction years.

Nevertheless, they do agree with Del-

ado that government officials did great damage to the country

by illicitly allowing immigrants.

These officials took ad-

vantage of the fact that there were no control measures to
check the influx of clandestine aliens into the country.
The liberal dispositions of the 1904 Constitution were out-

dated drastically and demanded

a

substantial reform, especial-

ly in its judicial aspects.
A general overview of the 1904 and 1941 Constitutions,
and of the laws and statutes^ reveals three different eras
in Panamanian politics regarding immigration.

First, the

policy was open; later, some restrictions were made evident,
and finally,

the attitude was to be negative.

These changes

were evidenced in the handling of various aspects of legal
and

clandestine immigration.
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During the late

1 9 00'e,

Government officials believed

that the future of Panama
depended on improving the agricultural economy.
In order to achieve this goal,
they decided to offer ample opportunities
to Europeans familiar
with rural economic activities. The
specifications required for their entrance and the
facilities the government offered them give an idea of the legal provisions.

On the

other hand, the modernization of the country through
road and

a

canal, demanded

a

a

rail-

large foreign labor force con-

trolled by the authorities responsible for those enterprises.
It was an imposed immigration which resulted in many problems.

In addition, the country had to face

which brought

a

a

clandestine immigration

new contingent of people and created differ-

ent problems.

Panama's increasing strategic and commercial importance
was attractive to foreigners.

visions

to

control this influx.

The government took legal pro-

Clandestine immigration

took place during the railroad and canal construction years
These periods

from 1850 to 1860, and from 1880 to 1914.

coincided with the economic booms.

At that time, it was

easy to enter Panama without being noticed.

These immigrants

originated from the Caribbean and Colombia especially and
most were black.

Many entered from the Pacific, temporarily

landing in the co*st town of Jaque and from there, going on
to Panama. City as if they were natives.

Others crossed the

dangerous selvatic region of the Darien Mountains until

they reached the small Indian hamlets where they
could find

temporary shelter.

A third group came into the country

through Panama City and Colon as crew members or as stowaways of the ships that stopped in both harbors.

These

illegal entries became so common that in the first two areas
above mentioned, the atio of foreigners to native Panamanians

was estimated as 2:1.

5

The fact that there was no body of legislation to deal

uniformly with this problem of illegal entry until 1941 had
serious implications for the country's economy and society.
Panama needed more people in its territory in order to progress, but they had to be of

a

kind that could contribute

Unskilled laborers who entered il-

to a normal prosperity.

legally into the country competed with the natives and succeeded, in leaving up to 50,000 without jobs.^

Officials

had no legal instrument to check the influx of foreigners.
The forty different documents relating to this problem lacked

the reinforcement of

a

uniform law.

Besides, many times

the normal process of each case met with the opposition of

some officers who found a way to amass a fortune by acceptin--

bribes in exchange of an identity card

(

cedula ) or other

n

document as proof of permanent residence.
lative reform was urgently needed.
was thought to

"be

A

general legis-

The Constitution of 1904

the answer because it included the new

resolutions about immigration.

However, the problem of

government employees
clandestine immigration and bribed

.

continued throughout the 1940'

s.

Panama had been dealing with the legal standing of
immigration since 1842.
In that year the Isthmian Assembly
im-

posed regulations having to do with black immigration.

The

Conservative government of Colombia approved of slave traffic
and wanted to take advantage of Panama's geographic position
to increase the trade,

but the latter

f

s

state assembly pro-

hibited the importation and trade of "human merchandise" in
an attempt to step effectively this lugubrious economic act-

ivity.

8

Onee independent, Panama organized all of the immigra-

tion legislation in its first Constitution of 1904.
1941,

q
such legislation was clarified many times.
-

'

Before
The prin-

cipal documents relating to immigration are as follows:
1.

Articles 6,8,9,10,16,19,

Constitution of 1904:

and 21.
2.

Constitution of 1941:

3.

laws:

4.

Decrees:

Articles 10,12,13,14,15,17,
18,21,22,23,31,41,106,152,
andl68.

From 1904 to date, there are sixteen laws
specifically related tc immigrants.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs made effective the policy expressed in the 12
decrees approved by the President of the

Republic
5.

Statutes:

a)

Administrative Code (Codigo Adminisdedicated its first two
trative)
chapters exclusively to immigration.
:

b)

Civil:

39 40,74,
and 77 deal with the subject.

Articles

1,

5a,

6,

Commerce:

c)

Articles 8,9,10,11, and
60 regulated the commercial activities of forein
ers.

d)

Labor:

Article 605 established
the ratio between Panamanian citizens and foreign
ers to be employed by a
commercial or industrial
firm in the country.

The National Constitution of 1904 was an expression of

liberal political thinking.

? r om its beginning the document

was concerned with the well being of the population as a

whole.

Additionally, it guaranteed all the benefits of hu-

man freedom to the country's inhabitants.

On the subject

of citizenship, the 1904 Constitution also appeared to be
open.

Article

6

stated that regardless of their parent's

nationality, all those who were born on Panamanian. .soil native citizens.

Naturalization was granted to those who,

after residing in the country for more than ten years, wished to become citizens.

11

Although this last provision re-

quired that the applicant enjoy

a

certain degree of econo-

mic stability, it was not di criminatory on the basis of race

Usually, if economic requirements were estblished, it would

follow that the disadvantaged group of people would be of
the darker race.

However, given the nature of their work,

in the Pathe Vest Indians enjoyed relatively good salaries
so that if
nama Canal Company, compared to the local wages,
case, the West Indians
so desired, which was rarely the

ease.
could become citizens with relative

2
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Unfortunately, the situation changed after the
completion of the canal. More than half of the West
Indian
labor force joined the ranks of the unemployed
in Panama.
The legislative Act

ammended Article

6,

(

Acto Le^islativo )

of October 19, 192S

stating that those persons who were born

in the Isthmus of foreign parents would be considered Pana-

manian citizens if after their 21st birthday they opted for
.

said nationality. 1

Articles 8 and

9,

assured that the fo-

reigners would enjoy the same general rights of Panamanian
citizens.

Article 16, protected individual rights and e-

quality before before the law for Panamanians and foreigners.
In Article 19, the Republic promised the emancipation of

those slaves who migrated to Panama.

Finally, Article 21,

granted free and restricted travel withing the national te13
rritory to all.

Unlike that of 1904, the Constitution of 1941 is

a

ma-

nisfestation of the biased political attitude which was then
predominant in the Isthmus.

For three years, an intransi-

gent nationalism which has been classified as "fascism" by

writers on the subject, had dominated Panama.

Its most emi-

nent exponent Arnulfo Arias employed racist tactics to convince Panamanians that the West Indians were responsible for
all ills of the Republic.

Consequently, the Arias govern-

constitutionally of resment in 1941 proceeded to rid itself
Indian descent.
ponsibility towards the Panamanians of West
document, approximately
With the promulgation of the 1941
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50,000 were ipso facto

subjected to

a

,

"denationalized"

(

desnacionalizados )

long period of persistent racial discrimina-

tion the effects of which can still be felt.
The preamble of the national document states that it

was the duty of the National Assembly to promote the improvement of the nation.

The state guaranteed all the civil and

political rights to native Panamanians only. 1 ^

Article 10,

declared that Panama's official language was Spanish and
held the state responsible for the maintenance of its purity and promulgation throughout the country,

an indirect

statement that no other language would be tolerated.

Coin-

cidentally, the majority of West Indians spoke English and
verv little Spanish.

Regardless of their parent's nationality, those born
in the Republic's

nian citizens.

jurisdiction would be considered Panama-

They would not be so considered if one of

their parents was of prohibited immigration

prohibida)

,

especially if the parent was

speaking black.

1'

Article 13 made

a

a

(

imnigracion

non-Spanish

provisional exception

one preoeeding it.
to the conditions exposed in the

For

became effective, the
three months after the Constitution
Panamanian citizenPresident of the Republic could grant
of parents of prohibited imoffspring
the
to
birth
by
ship
they lived in, and had
that
evidence
showed
who
migration
jurisdiction all their child
country's
the
to
subjected
been
had to be able to prove
also
The
y
years.
adult
hood and

8
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that Spanish was the language spoken at home.

Another res-

triction was the limitation imposed upon traveling within
the national territory.

16

Article 14 allowed immigrants who were not classified
as "prohibited immigrants",

to become Panamanian citizens.

The following article gave power to the President to deny
17
citizenship to those applicants he considered unsuitable.

Articles 21 and 22 recognized the civil rights of the foreigners, but established certain limitations.

First, they re-

served political rights for native Panamanians.

Second, they

stated that immigrants would be legally treated according to

their behavior.

This Constitution and other Public Treaties

(Tratados Publicos ), intended to regulate immigration.

The

government was to be responsible for the selection-of "Healthy elements, hard workers, those who would be able to adopt
to the
to national life and who were caprble of contributing

the nation."
ethnic, economic and demographic improvement of

1

be no
Although Article 31 specified that there would

exile would not be imdeath penalty and that the penalty to
Indian-Panamanians were
posed upon Panamanians, many West
Constitution was promulthe
after
shortly
exile
into
forced
for them to show
Three months was too short a time
gated.

born, lived and had gone
were
they
that
proof
documented
very difficult if not
was
it
Moreover,
Panama.
to school in
was predominantly spoken.
Spanish
that
prove
to
impossible,
extremely unfair but
only
not
was
measure
Obviously, this
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represents a shameful stage in Panamanian legislation, as
well as an international disgrace.

Between the enactment of the 1904 Constitution and that
of 1941 Panamanian legislation adopted a series of legal dis-

positions which delineated the governments' policy concerning
immigration, especially in its attempt to promote the flow
of desired elements into the country.

Unfortunately, the so-

cio-economic changes brought upon the Isthmus by the completion of the Canal, were decisive factors in the shift of im-

migration policy.

No longer was the government's purpose to

promote desired immigration, but to check the flow of those

persons which were considered disadvantageous to the development of the nation.

Decree Mo. 34 in 1911 encouraged the immigration of farmers, professionals, technicians, and retired people to Panama.

In 1913,

the Isthmian National Assembly approved Law 20

on January 31, with the purpose of populating vacant pieces

of lands for cultivation.

Articles 25 and 26 of the first

paragraph in Chapter III, offered full ownership of plots of
lands measuring ten hectares each (24.71 acres) to those Pa-

namanian families or foreigners with permanent residence in the
to
country who did not already own farming land, but desired

Other legal provisions such as Lav 32 of 1919, and

do so.

Pecree

6

of 1921, continued to pursue this objective.

The

already occuoffer was valid either for the plot which they
other part of the country
pied without legal claim or in any
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where land was available.

The proposal held true for those

prospective immigrants, and their families, who entered the
country to dedicate themselves to rural economic activity.

Government officials, eager to secure laborers, communicated
to the Spanish and Italian governments in 1913 and 1914

through

a

special, semi-official, representative by the name

of Antonio Eurgos, who had conducted a study on the feasibi-

lities of such project.
sified as "civilized."

Immigration via these laws was clas

1°

Promoting the maintenance of white supremacy against
the impending menace from the super-imposed immigration of

blacks, was perhaps the motive for encouraging such immigration.

The Spanish government was enthusiastic in its res-

pnse to the initiative "so promising" to Panama.

20

The

Panamanian government thought that the offer would attract
many prospective farmers from those countries which would
be more adaptable to Panamanian culture.

Nevertheless, few

came because the building of the canal still gave more imme-

diate financial compensation.
The construction of the canal was completed in 1914.
for the task
The large labor force which had been employed

was no longer needed.

The mass of unemployed made them-

either by their lack
selves felt in the Panamanian economy,
labor force of the
of funds, or by challenging the normal
the trades, esM 0 st European migrants engaged in
country.
shopkeepers or
tablished themselves as small merchants,

restaurant owners.

They blended into the national group

quickly due to their common Latin heritage.
on the unemployed.

About

1795

The West Indians

went to work for the United Fruit

Company in the banana plantations throughout Central America.
A

smaller percentage continued to be employed as the mainte-

nance staff of the Panama Canal Company.
jobless.

The rest remained

Although they considered their stay as transitory,

Company
few took advantage of the repatriation which the Canal

guaranteed.

Canal
While many still hoped to find jobs in the

employment.
Zone, they had to turn to Panama in search of

openings for
The country did not have sufficient job
West Indians. As they contithe natives, much less for the
the living conditions
nued to be out of permanent employment,
These consumers were no
deteriorated.
Indians
West
of the
been to the Panamanian landlonger as profitable as they had
government started to reThe
general.
in
commerce
lords and
As a result, the National
gard then an unpleasant burden.
immito the list of unwanted
Indians
West
the
added
Assembly
was passed to implement
1926
23,
November
of
Law 13
g ration.
Article 1 forbade
on immigration.
measures
government
new
Japanese, Syrians, Turks, IndoChinese,
of
the immigration
(Indo-arios) DraviIndo-Arians
As ians (indico-orientales),
Blacks, whose or,Guyanese
as
well
as
diane and W e st Indians
21
Those already established
o^ifih
+ Spanish.
not
girpl language was
out of the counttemporarily
-ravel
v,ofl
^^
v
+
r
wished ,o
as residents who
were married to a Pananr^pce
they
tne}
unless
re-entry,
rv were denied
,

•

^ci
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manian or who har\
had their business
recorded in the Civil
Registry.
Also in 1926,
immigration quotag
g ° Vernment :iUStified

«*« -asure

^ ^ttt*.

The

as an economic necessity

and assigned the
following numbers:

Group

A:

Holland, Switzerland
Norway and Sweden

200 perBOns/yr

Group B: Australia, Denmark,
New Zealand,
Plnland
Group

100

Germany, Austria and Philippines
50
Group D: Haiti and other countries
not
specified in the previous groups,
nor those of prohibited immigraiion
.
10
The quotas excepted foreign immigrants
working in the P anama
Canal.
They were subjected to the regulations
contained in
the various Public Treaties
( Tratados
Fublicos ). Law 16 of
January 31, 1 9 27 ammended Law 13. The racial
discrimination
C:

in this document is evident when it stated
that those belong

ing to the races referred to in the first article
of Law 13
of 1926, would not be admitted as immigrants even if they

had been born in, or were citizens of another country.
to 1923,

Up

the annual immigration quotas were set according

to the perrons'

country of origin.

gration quotas were based on race/-'

Fro^ that year on, imraiLav;

16 also granted

the executive power authorize ticn to allow West Indian immi-

grants into the country provided that the applicant, in this
case the United States,

could prove that:
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a)

There was a shortage of specialized workers in
the
country that were required for specific projects
0
in the Canal.

b)

The project or work required was for the public
benefit or was of an agricultural nature.

c)

The immigrant worker's salsries would not be lower
than the national minimum wage. p
•

This change in legal dispositions reflected the influential
role played by the United States and the Canal Zone Govern-

ment in the country's decisions.
In 1938, Law 54 reaffirmed in its fifteenth article the

discriminatory policies enacted through twenty-four years of
immigration legislation.

It stated:

"The immigration of Chinese, gypsies, North
Turks, and non-Spanish speaking blacks, is
prohibited.
Those foreigners belonging to
races, who come as substitutes of a fellow
will be considered as transients only, and
able to reside in the national territory"

Africans,
absolutely
any of these
countryman,
will not be

In order to guarantee the enforcement of these measures, the

National Assembly established the Central immigration Office
Through Law 79 on J u ly 25, 1941, Chapter II, Title VII. Classified as

"Preventive Police Service" (Servicio de Policia

a

Preventive)

,

this office verified the legal entrance, the place

of residence, and departure of all immigrants and residents.

According to Nicolas Delgado, the immigration officers used
25
graft.
for
measures
restrictive
these

Other decrees res-

the country
tricted "prohibited" immigrants once they were in

Panamanian life.
limiting further their participation in
as 1914, to curtail their
early
as
enacted
were
laws
Work
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their economic activities.

For example, Law

6

of October 29,

1914 protected native Panamanian
workers against the impending threat of West Indians
after the completion of the
canal.
According to this law, employers were
to choose native workers over the foreigners
under equal circumstances.
The United States would have to
hire at least 50°i
of its

permanent labor force from those unemployed
native citizens
while the project lasted. Another, law
6, passed on October 13, 1926, required that Panamanian or
foreign owners of
all business,

commercial, agricultural, and industrial esta-

blishments functioning within the national territory to have
at least 75% of their laborers Panamanian. 26

In 1930,

the

National Assembly approved Law 17 of December 19, prohibitin
immigration of workers engaged in trades that would be competitive to those of Panamanians.

Although this particular

measure was justified by the onslaught of the great depression,

it was obvious that the Panamanian government had

failed to create sufficient jobs for its workers.

Notwith-

standing, the government claimed to protect the national interests.

Government officials contended that Panamanian le-

gislation rejected West Indians' immigrants based on economic factors alcne.

Notwithstanding, social rejection of

this group was being nurtured on the side also.

The Panama-

nian government implemented further labor restrictions on

immigration in 1931, by prohibiting the entrance of artisans
to the country.

71,

25

Law 16 of November 16, 1931 modified Law

in order to clarify the restricted group.

29

As they
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would no longer be able to come to Panama as manual
workers,
the West Indians had claimed to be artisans in their appli-

cations as an alternative for entry.
Finally in 1941, the Decree-Law 28 of July 28, provided

native workers with absolute protection.

Those persons of

prohibited immigration were banned from all kinds of jobs
except those of

a

menial nature.

They might dedicate them-

selves to agriculture, aviculture, apiculture, hand laundering
and domestic occupations or they could be chauffeurs, mecha-

mcs,

or artisans.

30

Aside from all these belittling prac-

tices against West Indians they were forbidden to express

their religious, philosophic, political

or scientific ideas

through public means of communication such as the press.

Moreover, they could not openly formulate opinions about the

country's national politics.

31

After the adoption of the 1941 Constitution, the West
Indian migrant felt more acutely the steady pressure of na-

tionalism working to restrict and finally to reduce him to
a

negligible factor in the socio-economic structure of the

country.'

2

All these measures forced the total separation

constituof this social group from the Panamanian national
ency.

would
Instead of finding ways to plan programs that

of life, the
promote their integration to the nation's way
policies contributed
persistently discriminatory immigration
their host country's culto the West Indian's rejection of

ture

.
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One of the principal reasons underlining
the appeal of

Panama as a haven in 1904, was its alleged political
freedom

characterized by the total absence of discrimination against
the foreigners.

Differences of race did not matter.

What

interested the country was the betterment of the ethnic formation of its inhabitants and to look for a greater homogeneity of the society.

This idealistic position had received

many set backs by 1941, by the creation of standard rules in
order to select the immigrants according to race.

The adop-

tion of the anti-democratic position of prohibiting immigration, particularly the one composed of black people who did

not speak Spanish was one of these policies.

The review of

the Constitutions of 1904 and 1941 shows that the basic con-

tradictions between both and the use of many other legal tool
are proof of patent discrimination against a large group of

people who contributed to the welfare of the country.

,

.
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CHAPTER IV

OFFICIAL REJECTION OF VEST INDIAN

s

.
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A few weeks after proclaiming its independence from

Spain on November 28, 1821, Panama's new leaders decided to
united their country's destinies to those of Colombia. A

significant number of 'Panamanians' regretted having approved of the annexation.

Many felt that as Panama had volunta-

rily joined the State of Colombia, she should be granted a

generous degree of autonomy.

In.

fact, that nation's econo-

mic and political evolution was incongruous to the latter'
archaic and centralist political structure.

Colombia's

treatment of the Isthmian province was cause for growing

discontent among Panamanians.

According to

G-.

A. Mellander,

such uneasiness nurtured a "spirit of revolution and separa-

tion" which "manifested itself with recurring regularity

throughout the years of Colombian hegemony over Panama."
This chapter will deal with the rise of Panamanian national-

ism under Colombian rule and the socio-economic factors which

buttressed it curing the first four decades of the present
century
The representatives of the democratic movements in Panama,

adopted the liberal doctrines.

Simon Bolivar's military

to sepavictories in South America gave an important thrust
independence was proratist ideals. in November 28, 1821,
general acceptance
claimed in Villa de los Santos, receiving
Eon Jose Pabrega was appointed
made known.

as soon as it was

first governor of the new country.

However, he had to accept

Panama as part of
recognizing
decision
unanimous
an almost
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Gran Colombia (Estado Republicano de Colombia). 1 Above
all,
Fabrega tried to avoid violence coming from those who objected to Panama's annexation to Colombia and recognized the eco-

nomic advantage of the country's location between two continents and oceans.

Upon joining Gran Colombia, one of the first

demands made in Panama was that popular elections be held for

Assembly representatives.
The decision to become part of Colombia resulted from the

need for defense against potential reprisals from Spain, but
union with Colombia brought few benefits.

The language of

their former colonizer was almost the only link that united

both countries.

•

When Colombia showed through parish divisions,

the difficulty it had in keeping the Gran Colombian union, Pa-

nama felt confident enough to propose

a

reunification of Gran

Colombia through its administration which had separated on

September 26, 1S30 from Colombia.

The military commander of

the Isthmus, General Jose P. Espinar, offered the government
of Panama to Bolivar.

2

At Bolivar's request, Panama rejoined

Gran Colombia three months later.

movement
General Eligio Alzuru began another separatist
July

9,

1831,

creating

a

dictatorship that lasted 50 days

Herrera's troops.
until it was crushed by General Tonas
the Isthmian EeHerrera was appointed General Commander of
assumption of power.
partment in July of 1831 during Alzuru's
deposition, General Herrera betotal
Alzuru's
General
After
In 1832, Gran Colombia
came provisional governor of Panama.
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became Nueva Granada with the drafting
uraixmg n-r
of a^ new constitution
and Juan Jose Argote was appointed Governor
of Panama.

Thus,

the division of powers, long sought
in Panama, was established when Argota was in charge of civil
matters and General

Ferrer of the military.

Their administration was

a

progres-

sive one which showed the administrative
capacity of the local government,
A factor which was important in their gov-

ernment program, was the creation of
belo as

a

a

free port in Porto-

means to combat smuggling and create more facil•x

ities for commercial activities.
A Panamanian, General Herrera's nomination as military

commander of the Isthmus, strengthened the desire for independence through the years.

The political instability of the

Colombian administration caused an impact in Panama, and the
economic depression reduced the region to real misery.

Both

factors strongly contributed to the thought that the best

solution for Panama could be found in independence.

On Nov-

ember IS, 1840, the Isthmian Assembly declared its separation from

a

central government which the majority of Nueva

Granada's provinces opposed.

Panama left the door opened

to the possibility of becoming a state once more,

eral government was implanted in Colombia.

if a fed-

Nevertheless,

Panama bagan its new independence under the name of Free
.

State of the Isthmus (l s tado Libre del Isthmus).

4

The in-

dependence experience made evident the Isthmus capacity for

maintaining an autonomous government.

Luring this time, an

.
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army and police force were constituted.

An economic struc-

ture was developed, based on a triburary system
allowing

investments on education; such as, the creation of

a

Uni-

versity, as well as the establishment of economic and di-

plomatic relations with Costa Rica.
Unfortunately, the life of the new country was of short
duration, ending on November 28, 1841.

Although General

Herrera refused to rejoin Nueva Granada, Panama's legislative body was "persuaded" to accept Colombia's proposal.

Nevertheless, the experience had clearly revealed the deep

nationalistic convictions of the Panamanian people and their
persistent efforts to find

the.

recognition of their rights.

A vague promise of some autonomy helped Colombia reaffirm

its power in the Isthmus.

Due to its implicit weakness, and in order to secure

Panama for its own, Colombia supported the Monroe Doctrine
to avoid any foreign intervention in the Isthmus.

As a re-

sult, in 1846 Nueva Granada signed an agreement called the

Kallarino-Pidlack Treaty with the United Ctates.
changefor the right to establish
anr

a

In ex-

passageway through Pan-

convenient to its expansionist projects, the United

States government guaranteed Colombian sovereignty in said

term ory

5

In 1849, the liberal Party succeed eo in replacing the

Conservatives in the Colombian government.

titution was the liberals' attempt to create

The 1853 consa

federal state

°3

within a unitary Republic. 6

constitution established

a

In Pebruary 27>

^^^

specific regulation regarding Pa-

nama, through which it was
granted local autonomy.
The army
and navy, foreign affairs, income
and credits corresponding
to the federal

state, remained under the Colombian govern-

ment which might intervene in the
interoceanic communication whose benefits were designed
to pay its foreign debt.
From 1851-1855, Panama enjoyed her first
period of peace
and prosperity under General Herrera's third tern
as governor.

The circumstances created by the construction of the

railroad, brought the first stage of modernization to the
country.

Money was abundant and circulated in gold.

The

economic activities shifted from rural to merchantile.

The

bonanza helped to rebuild the main cities, to open' schools
and hospitals,

to update plazas and to open new markets. U-

tilizing its autonomy, the government proved efficient in its
administration of public funds.

It was obvious to the nu-

merous foreigners who worked or traded in Panama, that this
country had a personality of its own.
The pride of being necessary to the world at large

ant?

the assurance of tapping an inexhaustible treasure, v/ere
two attitudes that underlined the character of Panamanians.

From now on, this popular feeling constantly developed into
a

strong nationalism in spite of adverse situations.

basic objectives defined this nationalism:

Three

to preserve the

cultural heritage through the use of Spanish as the official
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language and as

a

tool for education; to protect the rights

of the "Spanish" social class through the imposition of

strict regulations for immigrants of different races, and
to administer exclusively the country's wealth.

During the 1860's, two major changes occurred in PanaOne was the separation of church and state in 1862.

ma.
"Don

Manuel Maria Diaz' provisional government seized church

wealth and properties.

It banned the various religious com-

munities, such as convents and abbeys and expelled nuns from
Panama, September

drafting of

a

9,

1862.

7

Another change followed the

new constitution, May 8, 1863.

The United

States of Colombia became the name of the new federal gov-

ernment which was composed by Antioquia, Bolivar, Boyaca,
Cauca, Cundinamarca, Magdalena, Panama, Santander, and To-

lima.

Panama was constituted as

a

governors would now be presidents.

sovereign state whose
From 1864-1871, there

were fratricidal encounters within the military sector about

whether the state militi? or the National Guard, had more
predominance, causing an alarming lack of public security
as Panamanian historian Ruben D.

was

a

Carles has written:

"it
Q

labyrinth of person?! preferences and interests."
in ColomThere was controversy in Panama, as well as

bia,

concerning the former's real status.

Some thought Pa-

state With complete
nama should be considered a sovereign
as part of
Others, could only envision the Isthmus
powers.
with the beginning
The situation climaxed in 1893
Colombia.

of the War of a Thousand Days.

Although this war was

a ma-

jor conflict within Colombia, some Panamanian
leaders made

independence their objective during this civil
aggression.
The international acknowledgement of Panama as
a strategic
point for the future, was particularly appealing to the United States government.

It would try to be first in having

the privilege of control over the Isthmus.

The government

of Panama was aware of every strategy designed to arrive at

that goal.

Economically, the situation had changed, the

bankruptcy provoked by the French enterprise on the canal,
had affected everyone.

Dissatisfaction toward the Colombian

government was the result.

On the other hand,

since the Col-

ombian senate disapproved the Eerran-Hay Treaty, relations
lack of unity

with the United States became highly strained,

for a positive independence left the country in the hands of

many leaders who preferred the destruction of
that lasted three years to the benefit of

a

When independence was reached on November

3,

a

civil war

common entente.
1903

,

the new

The new treaty for

nation was almost taken by surprise.

the construction of the canal between independent Panama and
the United States, was not known to most Panamanians until

much later.

It seeme* as if everyone was framed in order

to recognize the necessity of an independent country, while

at the same time,

ality.

to curtail the development of its nation-

Such disposition forewarned

a

strange and dangerous

officials.
alliance between the U.S. and certain Panamanian

Panama, as an independent
country, could not assure real
stability in its future and act
according to the location of
its territory and its "immense
wealth".
The United States'
presence would be cause for
constant frictions, misunderstanding and finally, of a national
movement against its
role.
The administration privileges
of the Canal,
and the

right to intervention in Panama's
political life, as granted
in Article VII of the 1 9 03 Treaty,
could only end in a national liberation movement. 9
T he rights granted in the 1903 treaty
were ratified in the 1904 Constitution.
Already in the late
1910's, the nation's 'progressive' sectors stated their
oppo-

sition to the various United States military interventions,
as well as to the different administrations which had
been

collaborating and benefited from such measures.

At that time,

the use of force, silenced this opposition, but it helped to

strengthen the group of professionals and young people who
wished to put an end to the 1903 Canal Treaty.
In the late 1930*3,

would-be president Dr. Arnulfo Arias

Madrid, emerged as the spokesman for national feelings.

His

government represented the national bourgeoisie as well as
the popular sectors of the cities and countryside. 10

Arias

changed the National emblem from 'Pro mundi beneficio' to
"honor,

justice and freedom".

The reformist program rejected

North American influence by including a general revision of
the 1904 constitution which was a clear expression of the
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will that Panama belonged
to Panamanians alone.
The theme
of "Panama for Panamanians",
would lead to the reorganization of the nation as
whole, and to the establishment
of rigid norms for its socio-nnli+i^^
C1 ° Poetical structure.
Black immigrants who did not speak
Spanish were one of the victims of
the revision. The
revisionist measures sought to
reaffirm a /
national identity through a
restructuring of the socio-economic system, in order to
counteract the dependent mentality
which had developed, due to the
all-encompassing nature of the

United States preset, in the Isthmus. 11
Panama's economic
development was difficult and
disproportionate.
Fluctuations of the interoceanic transit, inherently
affected the country's production activities. The temporary or transient population at times was
superior in number
to the permanent one.
Because of the country's particular

economic activities, the population density differed from
one place to another disproportionately.

Additionally, the

rural migration to the urban sectors maintained the local

markets severely limited in scope, making it difficult for
the creation of basic industries.

These markets were also
highly dependent upon outside stimuli. 12 Aside from disad-

vantageous competition with the United States, the lack of

accessibility to business probability estimates for Panamanian industrialists, private enterprises, and commerce in

general, deterred long range investments and the exploitation of national resources through industrial development.

^
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Instead, most capital remained static, engaged only in shortrange investments and preferably those which would render dis-

proportionally high interests to the amount invested. 13
The working-class was most affected by these circumstances

because permanent employment was not guaranteed.

They could

find only seasonal jobs which involved, in most cases, humi-

liating working conditions.

As a result, the unemployed sought

to work in the two sectors which could guarantee them a permanent

and constant li velihood— the
Panamanian government and the

North American administration of the Panama
Company. 4 Neither proved beneficial

C a nal

Zone and

nor served as promoters

of an adequate and necessary national identity.

Government

employees received pay for their political loyalty rather
than their administrative output— a policy which led" to the

deterioration of the merit system and the prevalence of influential, but highly incompetent personnel. The bureacracy underestimated the worker's production and degraded his social
function.

On the other hand,

the Panama Canal Company instill'

ed feelings of apathy, rejection and alienation among Panama-

nian laborers towards their country.

a

During the 1920' s, the general attitude of Panamanians
was pessimism, distrust, and apprehension for their future.

Very few believed that Panama could function* ae an independent
and self reliant political entity.

V/ithin this context,

can not only justify Arnulfo Aria's emergence as

a

one

reactionary

nationalist, but also state that his political presence cor-

.
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responded to the times and to the historical
necessity of
the country in that 'stage of development'.
In order to

reaffirm the concept of nationality in Panamanians,
it would
be necessary to erradicate their anti-national
mentality, by
emphasizing the possibility of being absorbed by a foreign
culture, namely the United States, 15 which
could very well
have "used" Vest Indians an instruments for their 'cultural

penetration

'

The awakening of Panamanian consciousness was manifested
in the various integration efforts during the 1930' s, in the

hopes of achieving national consolidation.

Politically pro-

gressive sectors, especially the student movements, began
to question the country's conventional axioms.

They advo-

cated a process of national 'regeneration', increasingly

based on nationalistic principle.

In 1935, the National TJ-

niversity was founded and new political parties emerged to
search for

a

true definition of the Panamanian 'essence'.

Intellectuals wrote on the nature of Panamanian culture, or
Panamenidad as it has been called. Octovio Mendez Pereira
stated that Panama's 'spiritual life' was intimately related
to the country's transitory nature, which curtailed the de-

velopment of strong traditions and
of its nationality.

1

a

better understanding

Diogenes de la Rosa proposed that the

given economic infrastructure of the country coupled with
nan as
nians.

a

'social being', determined the character of PanamaHe went on to say that their carefree attitude, their

8

)
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preference for improvisation and lack of
projection were the
results of "acquired wealth without effort", causing a spiritual and cultural superficiality. 17

Diego Pominguez Caba-

llero stressed that the society's lack of homogeneity, the
sharp contrast between the desolate introverted rural ambience and the complex, extrovert urban setting, created three

different worlds— the campesino

pecially in the cities.

.

capitalize

,

and criollo

— es-

He contended that Panamanians were

impulsive and emotive, lacking enough consciousness and effort to fight for what they wanted.

1

The change in political trend, as well as people's

attitudes was reflected in 1934 when Panama refused

a

United

States check for ^250,000 as payment for the Canal Zone territory.

It demanded that the payment be made in gold,

the paper currency had been devaluated.

as

Another example

occurs in 1936 with the signing of the Arias-Roosevelt Treaty,
also called the General Treaty of Friendship and Collabora-

tion

(

Tratado General de Amjgtart y Cooperacion

.

This was the

first treaty that was partially beneficial to Panama.
"did

awfcj

with" United States' intervention.

It

The United

States would, no longer 'defend* Panama's sovereignty or ac19
quire any additional lands for the 'canal's maintenance'.
That same ye?r, the rent of the canal was increased from

$250,000 per year, to $450,000.
Panama's reputation of
to more adequately,

a

melting pot has been referred

as a "mosaic milieu.

In spite of

living in close proximity, racial groups did not intermingle
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in significant percentages to affect each
other's character-

istics deeply.

Lacking in orientation, leadership and

a

strong sense of national unity, Panama's nationalists increasingly began to focus on the West Indian group, They
considered this group an obstacle to the reaffirmation of
their nationality.

"No hard and fast lines, barred one

from participation in any field on the basis of race", but
it is true that the restrictions were experienced in an eco-

nomic level.

on

The greatest restrictions against West Indians

occurred curing periods of depression and acute
Then national resentment was at its highest
were preferred for Canal Zone employment

,

f

tin

employment*

as West Indians

because they would

work for less money and were assigned local rates.

Panama-

nian nationalists also saw their culture endangered as Protestanitism, with its unnumerable sects and practices, became more influential.

22

As nationalism grew,

the country's racial composition

was described by the government as an overwhelming mixture
of Spanish and Indian, placing other racial groups, such as

blacks, mestizos and mulattoes as secondary.

Table VIII pro-

vides the racial distribution of the total population in 1941.
It shows mulattoes as the largest group, totaling 354,079.

Although Panamanians did not enjoy being considered

a

black

nation, they were proud to tell of the "historically rebe-

llious nature of the native negroes".
west Indians were servile and slavish.

Compared to them, the

Therefore, Panamanians
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could not feel any racial solidarity with
as "impotent" as they were.

a

group that was

The Biesanzs make an interesting

point in saying that:

"Panamanian resentment of the Chombo* has been tied
up with their fear of the yanquis."^
Chombo is a local

During the 1930 s-40
'

has lost

a

used to describe the West Indians.

terra
'

s

,

'Chombo' was derogatory term, but it

lot of its original meaning.

In 1939, when Panamanian nationalis, was very strong and

Arnulfo Arias had been isisting for some time that the nation
ethnic composition could not afford to absorb any more blacks
the United States exerted pressure on the national legislatur
to

allow

a

fourth wave of West Indian immigration for the con

struction of the third set of locks.

So that against its

will and contrary to the government measures, Panama was coerced into allowing more West Indians to come. Nevertheless,

government officials demanded that

a

clause in the contract

stipulate that they were definitely forbidden to enter the
against
national territory. Although popular opinion was
sympathetic
W e st Indian presence, there were others who were
to their situation.
to this group, giving it serious thought

dealt with
An editorial of the Panama Tribune in 1939,

this matter extensively:

governments of the variWe believe it is time that the
British government
ous West Indian Islands and the
those island,
which is responsible for the welfare of
enplcyrent of the brawn
begin to find avenues for the
population of the isand sinew and intelligence of the
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1

if ^'

in a
,

the

f n t in their own ^land home,
certainly witht
br 2 ad? expanse of an empire
which
has
Mnltni+pfl
P
untold

lU it n^P

resources. The West l2dian*go^£ents
fiara
di6ni y contin
to maintain
-??.

^V-

5

'

^

ly for the sake of being provided with the
dtil? br?ad
of life which they have difficulty in obtaining
° in their
own homes.
"

If West Indian workers are to be brought again to work
on the Panama Canal, it should be on the basis of better
wages and better conditions or even the prevailing standard which, God knows is bad enough, although better than
lorneriy.
There should be no lowering of the scale, no
retrogression to former times. In all the picre^ive
countries of the world, a proper value is being placed
upon the labor of man.
The West Indian should not continue^ to be the only exception to this rule.
It is on
this basis that we rest our entire objection.
If it is
to be utilized, there must be a New Deal for Wes 4 Indian
labor. 2 4
:

The work lasted five years.
a

West Indians did not get

better deal, approximately 23% of the 25,000 workers brought

in from Jamaica,

returned home although their contracts clear-

ly forbade them to come into Panama, West Indians were compel-

led to do so, as unemployed immigrants were not able to re-

main in the Canal Zone territory.

One of the reasons was Ca-

nal Zone government's inability and unwillingness to the alien

population in the Canal Zone was estimated at 30,043.
The situation in Panama City was worse.

25

The capital was

not large enough to offer an ample market for the profession-

ally trained, much less for the unskilled laborers.

The pop-

ulation Census for 1921 counted 40,000 inhabitants in Panama
City.

increased
Nine years later, in 1930, the population had

94

TABLE VIII

POPULATION CENSUS, RACIAL DISTRIBUTION
1940

Indians

Mestizos

64,960
137,604-

Negroes

Source:

82,871

Mulattoes

271,208

Total

631,549

Panama.

Oficina del Censo.

Distribucion

de la poblacion por raza, 1940.

.
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up to 74,409.

Approximately 25% of the city's total popu-

lation was foreign born and predominantly black. 26

In 1940,

Panama City counted with 111,893 inhabitants, approximately
26.396,

or 29,402, were black.

(Gee table No. IX).

As the labor market was very limited, Panamanian de-

pendence on government jobs was high.
was

a

In addition, there

shift of control in the fields of activities from

one ethnic group to another.

The merchant activities, for-

merly in the hands of the national upper-class fell uner
the domination of Chinese, Hindus and Europeans.

Indian labor force constituted

a

The West

serious threat to the na-

tive workers in the menial or unskilled occupations
the factories,

tion work.

— in

chauffers, masons and in. construc-

as maids,

In order to protect citizens, national legisla-

tion stipulated that some professions required that prac-

titioners be Panamanian-born.

Real estate and government

employment were also fields exclusive for Panamanians

27

Once they retired from the Panama Canal Company, West

Indians lost the right to live in the Zone's budget housing,
to buy in the post exchanges,

or medical assistance.
of origin,

or to secure Zonian medicines

Cince few returned to their islands

they had no choice but to go to Panama's termi-

ties.
nal cities where they had friends and family

the 1940's to the 1960's,

per month.

From

their retirement pay was 025. CO

Panama's alThe retirees further aggravated
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TABLE IX

PERCENTAGE OF BLACK IN TOTAL POPULAT ION

Province of Panama

TOTAL POP.
171,939

Panama City

111,393

29,402

26.3

Province of Colon

57,297

28,703

50.0

Colon

44,393

23.532

53.0

9,949

5,357

59.0

Pro vine e of Bocas

Source:

BLACK POP. PERCENTAGE
22.5
33,770

George V/esterman, The Pr oblem of West Indian Offof gggg Heia;io:iL:iiips
> ^lu'..' u
s prings in Panama:
"Fetveen Ethnic and Cultural Groups in a Cosnio?olitan Setting. (Panama: 1944) p. 157
:

.
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ready serious housing,
Q a
hospital and
S, hosmt.i
rest home conditions.
After having given
their best years„
vearc +v
those who had worked
anywhere from 25 to ,o
years for the ?anama
Canal

bare necessities.
-0

-

,,

Approximate!, 75 „ of

years old.

0 f these,

^^

—

betwegn

nearly 8* needed to he
con-

fined to hospital heds or
to puhlic ho.es for
the elderly,
situation which would cost
the state almost S481.800.00
a
year.
The Canal Zone Government
would pay only 2 5% 0 f the
total expense, making Panaraa
responsihle for the rest
% 361, 350. 00

a

It was an unfair demand on Panama,

as only
an insignificant percentage
of those retiree! from the Zone,
had ever paid national taxes.

All of the above-mentioned factors
contributed to settin
the stare for Arnulfo Arias' interpretation
of Panamanian

nationalism.
al

Ke embodied his analysis of the state of
natio-

affairs in the pronouncement, of the Panamegfsta *
program.

At best, this 'program' attempted to instill national
pride,

dignity and self-respect for their culture in Panamanians.
At worse Panarce?.isno was political sensationalism based on ra
cir-1 discrimination.

^

Arnulfo Arias began to assert himself in national politics during the depression.

He rejected any foreign ideolo-

gies or influences even though his definition of Pa^iaroeglemo
as an innovation was vague.

In fact, Panamei:ismo was another

93

way to define nationalism
with
nature.

a

pre-eminent regionalistic

He thought it was necessary
to create more jobs,

paying higher salaries so that
the working class would benefit.
He called for close national
unity, discipline and
order, as well as for the
unification of the national ideologies and hopes to "assure" the
country's future. As a. nationalist, Arnulfo Arias call for a strong
and independent

government, which would not le representative of
the upper
class' economic interests, obstacles so long to the
socio-

political development of the country.

He refused to admit

that Panama's geographic position alone would determine its

government policies, much less distort its Indian- Spanish
(

Indo-espafiola )

,

'personality'.^ 0

According to Arias, Panama's racial composition was exclusively the result of an Indian and Spanish mixture. He
argued that people of other cultures were unassimilable and
should not be part of the national society.

He critized

actively the Chinese, Hindus and black West Indians alleging
thst they were undesirable because they did not speak Spa-

nish.

Many natives felt that West Indians brought dislike

upon themselves because they lacked 'personal care', were
misbehaved! socially and were

31
'ordinarily loud'.

Arias thought, Panama had

a

promising future if it

could overcome the "racial problem".

He was convinced that

this serious issue had its roots in the Canal construction
era, when the North American government introduced large

I
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numbers of people "of strange color into
our culture". 52
Arias did not deny that some West Indians,
once assi-

milated into the national culture, had contributed
to it.
However, he was extremely critical of those, he
considered
them the majority, who continued to live as strangers
grouped together in Panama City and Colon,
protected from expul-

sion because they were Panamanian -born and safeguarded through

their parents' British citizenship. 55

Arias also criticized

the United States immigration, measures and its insistence in

hiring West Indians only to work on the canal, aggravating
the social tension in Panama.

Economically, neither the

Asian or black-West Indian immigrants were helpful for Panama,

as there was a preponderance of unskilled labor that

could not be absorbed by an underdeveloped country.

••

Once

asked about immigration, Arias said:
The kind of immigration we want for our country, must
These
meet certain physical and moral requirements.
immigrants must be willing to work and share with our
noble and hospitable native, our nation. s wealth. Welcome are all artisans who come to teach their trade in
our shops and encourage the creation of industries.
Most of all, welcomed are the farmers who will come to
moke our lands fertile. ^4
1

The Panameiilsta program

regulator immigration.

(

el

credo panameflista

)

espoused

It stated that the numbers of immi-

grants should be allowed according to the country's capacity
-to

incorporate then.

The immigrant had to obey the laws, res-

"pananeilismo."
pect the country's traditions, and learn

,

but

Panamanians in the
he could not deliberately compete with
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professions.

Immigrants who came with intentions of exploiting

natives would be refused and/or repatriated.
Also to he refused were those who tried to promote
anti-democratic ideas,
'

•

as well as those who could possibly
create a

'minority problem'.

The objective of Arias' policy was to incorporate all

sectors of the population within the; national economy and to

introduce different groups of immigrants into the country gradually, taking into consideration Panama's ability to make
room for them it is society. Felipe Escobar justifies Arias'

policy on the ground that his racism was no different than that
of past administrations and at least he tried to set up a

screening process whereby the immigrants entering the country
could be prospective Panamanians.
The Panamenistt

36

"doctrine" climaxed with the ratifica-

tion of the 1941 Constitution.

It was a manifestation of the

Aries Administration's political ideology, as well as

flection of the popular sentiment at the time.

a

re-

Felipe Esco-

bar describes the Panamehista doctrine as being similar in
concept to Mussolini's fascist party in Italy, and Hitler's

Nazi party in Germany.

37

Maloney and Priestly designate

Arnulfo Arias' political ideology as a manifestation of Pana-

manian society's total rejection of West Indians. They contend that it was an outgrowth of foreign capital's association with the national oligarchy which imposed a normative

cultural pattern beneficial to their interests.

Ideologically,

participation in
the Panamenists doctrine curtailed minority

.
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in the political process.

Consequently, total national consciousness could not be achieved
if group divisions persisted.

v.F. Goytia affirms that the
ratification of the 1941
Constitution was the beginning of a
degeneration of human and

political principles which very well
could have led the country into anarchy. 39
The lack of an effective cultural
interaction between

Panamanians and West Indians was due to the
insufficiency of
adequate educational facilities, the absence of
industries,
scanty government interest and the affected group's indifferent and unsympathetic attitude toward their 'adopted'
8

counrjy.

These factors contributed to the immigrants' re-

fusal to take part in the national struggle of revindication.

Panama did not establish

a

minimum or preliminary edu-

cation program to explain its social norms to the newcomers.
Moreover, the restrictive measures for admission to the pu-

blic school system, kept many West Indian children isolated
from the Panamanian youth.

The government did not organize

any community program, to make the process of integration

smoother.

Neither the media--newspaper and radio—nor the

civic or religious groups m^de arrangements to arouse favorable public opinion about these immigrants

There was friction between the two groups as they competed for the few jobs available due to an almost non-exist-

entindustrialization process.

The government did institute

.

.

X no
C
i

\»/

well-defined economic practices which would foment the agricultural and industrial development in rural areas.
cities, employment went to those who had influence,

nos)

In the
(

padri-

In private business, the employee was insufficiently

•

compensated.

We see then that there were very few incent-

ives for immigrants.
The problem got worse because none of the governments

responsible for the immigrants

— Great

Britain, United States

or Panama—ever considered the West Indian worker's adapata-

tion to

a

different socio-cultural milieu.

Proof of the

apparent lack of concern for theri 'human merchandize* was
that the British and North Americans only considered their

work resiliency, not the cultural discrepancy between them
However, it would be unethical to

and the native group.

blame these governments alone.

As we have seen in previous

chapters, West Indians made things worse because they considered their stay in Panama, as transitory, not bothering
to

interact or learn

a

little about where they were living.

some
Their main, almost exclusive, interest was to acquire
with a better
wealth so they could return to their countries
po sit ion

whether or not West
The North Americans did not care
environment. Their only
new
their
to
adapting
were
Indians
that was demanded of them.
work
the
do
they
that
was
concern

ncn-white races did not
the
towards
attitude
bigoted
Their
participation in the Canal Zone's
black
allow
to
them
permit
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"socio-economic democracy".

On the other hand, Panama at-

tempted to free itself of the responsibility

,

instituting

and forcing the restrictive legal
measures which completely

disassociated the West Indian group from the
natives.

More-

over, it established a process of
denationalization of West

Indian-Panamanians.

Once the 1941 Constitution was approved,

approximately 50,000 of them had their citizenship revoked.
These measures were not the best that either government
could have adopted because different ethnic groups which

composed the Isthmian community could not be separated from
one another without undermining the country's nationality.

Greater work opportunities in the Canal Zone continued
to attract

V.'est

Indians and their offsprings.

Due- to the

international nature of the Canal, it was an advantage for
the Panama Canal Company to have

a

bilingual labor force.

Paradoxically, the Canal Zone government ignored or rejected
their requests for housing in its territory.

In turn, the

great majority lived in the Zone's outskirts, which were

Panama's slum areas

— Calidonia,

San Miguel and Chorrillo.

Panama only offered them economic conditions similar to
those of the islands.

Politically, the Vest Indians could

not or as an excape from their living situation, as well as
to amass

islands.

a

large quantity of money for their return to the
As

a

result, close ties were established between

the Canal Company and then.

Both groups, West Indians and
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North Americans, shared a common "background

— their

based culture, language and similar living styles.
commonality propitated
V.'est

a

BritishThis

gradual but constant process of

Indian assimilation of and adaption to North American

principles, way of life, and their feelings of superiority
tp Panamanians.

There was superficial West Indian assimilation of the

Panamanian cultural patterns.

Regardless of their deficien-

second-rate educy, ITorth Americans offered them at least a
from
cation, in comparison to Panama banning their children
its public schools.

West Indians felt a sense of gratitude

the racial discriminatowards North Americans, in spite of
After all, it was not
tion they experienced in the Zone.
in the British West
life
of
way
their
from
different
much
itself
Nevertheless, this ethnic group considered
Indies.

the product of

a

socially hybrid environment.

enjoy social, political
not
did
Indians
West
Although
large numbers and the
their
Panama.,
in
or economic stability
then to become more
allowed
there,
residence
long yea- of
Consequently, they con'population.
local
the
into
Pb^orbec
part of the national culture,
integral
an
themselves
sidered
economic transfercountry's
the
to
as they had contributed
stipulated
..
„ 0 + tr „c
,
»
especial
3 -, e cislly
j those
dispositions,
nation. The legal
Having
a big U«» to thee.
as
came
Constitution
in the -41
of origin. Vest Indians
countries
their
lo8 t ,11 ties Kith
Panamanian.
of life hut the
way
other
any
di , not *no«
.

.
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Like their predecessors in the British Islands, West

Indians now faced
a

a

similar socio-economic situation, but

worse political circumstance.

They had two alternatives-

emigration or endurance of the racial persecution.

The old-

er members of the West Indian community were inclined to

overlook the problem, its importance and implications.
A
popular choice was to attempt to secure United States' citizenship.

citizens.

A less attractive prospect was to become British

For those who wished to remain in Panama, the

only prerogative for West Indians was to fight to have their

inherent citizen rights restored.

National Civic League
them legally.

(

Li*:a

In 1944, they founded the

Civica Nacional ) to represent

They demanded that articles concerning immi-

gration and nationality in the 1341 Constitution be' abolished
It was the first time they would organize as a political in-

terest group to demand their inherent civil rights.

a
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The economic and socio-political
condition., that ex-

isted in the West Indies after the abolition
of slavery
j

y

resulted in mass unemployment for the freed
blacks.
Independently of this, Panama was striving for
its autonomy and
the exploitation, of its geographic

portant resource.

position— her most im-

As a growing industrial power,

those un-

employed blacks and Panama's location constituted an
important asset for the United States' expansionist goals.
Chapter one has shown how all the elements involved— West Indian

blacks, Panama and the United States

— co verged

for the con-

struction of the Panama railroad and later the Canal.
Chapter two indicates, how the mutual coexistence of
these groups proved to be a difficult problem.

Inequality

of power and the cultural dissimilarities between them, made

their acceptance and adaptation to each other almost impossible, especially for Panamanians and

V/est

Indians.

As the United States became the strongest economic sup-

port for the Isthmus* maintenance of its service economy

detrimental factor

.to

—

the development of a sound economic

system based on production--Panama was unable to react un-

favorably to the North American presence.
Panamanians thought that

V.'est

On the other hand,

Indians had nothing else to offer

except problems and cause them inconvenience.

Chapter three

demonstrates that in turn, Panamanians were able to react
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against them due to their
precarious situation.
The legislative measures that were enacted,
are proof of the evergrowing and constantly aggressive
governmental policy
affecting Y/est Indians.
These laws, decrees and statutes
serve as indicators for the
national and official rejection
of the Vest Indian immigrants.
We have seen in Chapter

four how

nation became an independent republic and
the underlying reasons for the nationalistic
tendencies which used
the West Indians as a stepping-stone towards Panama »s
socioa

culturrl unification.
A

large labor force was needed to construct the "road"

thai would reaffirm United States' power in the American con-

tinent, as well as the rest of the world.

Panama also need-

ed that labor force in account of the thrust given' to the

facilities that allowed it to profit at its highest level up
to then,

from. its riches in services which had an important

international value.

The lenfit produced by the

V.'est

Indians

was diminished by the inconvenience of their living in Panama.

Their numbers indicate the seriousness with which they

renounced to their islands in the hope of leading better
lives.

SPhey

hardly considered that one day they would be

branded as undesirables in their adopter! country.

The Pana-

manian will for full independence unfortunately resulted in
the alienation cf

have

rande

-

a

group who had shown through its work to

sincere contribution to the welfare of the Isth-

mus, regarless of who benefited.

It is understandable that
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Panama tried to be the exclusive administrator of its territory, but the adoption of this unfavorable attitude towards

W e st Indians, revealed the acute nature of the conflict of

Panamanian identity at the time.

I
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